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Abstract: The Medicaid Prescription Drug Rebate Program was enacted in 1990, granting the Medicaid
program “most-favored customer” status and requiring drug manufacturers sell their drugs to Medicaid
at the “best price” available to any other purchaser. Although drug rebates remain an integral part of
Medicaid today, the program’s legislative history is largely unexamined. This paper reveals the political story
behind the law, focusing on the dynamic between Senator David Pryor (D-Ark.) and the Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association, the trade group representing name-brand drug products.
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2Introduction
In 1990, the Medicaid Prescription Drug Rebate Program was enacted into law, mixed into a massive,
533-page, 5-year Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA 1990).1 The Medicaid rebate provisions of
OBRA 1990 granted the Medicaid program “most-favored customer” status, requiring drug manufacturers
sell their drugs to Medicaid at the “best price” available to any other purchaser. In return for accepting
the pricing provisions, drug companies would be assured that their products would be covered under each
state’s Medicaid prescription drug program.
Legislators promised that the rebate agreement would reduce state and federal Medicaid expenditures by
$3.5 billion across the program’s ﬁrst ﬁve years.2 Upon enactment, the bill’s author, Senator David Pryor
(D-Ark.) declared victory: “At long last, we have entered a new era, where the program serving the
poorest of the poor no longer pays the highest price for prescription drugs but instead gets a fair deal.”3
Likewise, House-sponsor Representative Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) was enthusiastic about the bill’s prospects
for cost savings: “The big drug companies have been stiﬃng Medicaid. We’ve ﬁnally made our case for
how outrageous this is.”4 By nearly all assessments, the government had fought a battle against the big
pharmaceutical industry and come out on top.
It has been over thirteen years since the initial passage of the rebate program. In some ways, the Medicaid
rebates have realized legislators’ promises and have been worthy of their initial praise. Participation in the
rebate program is extremely high with approximately 550 pharmaceutical company participants.5 Forty
1Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub.L. 101-508, Title IV, sec. 4401(a)(3), 104 Stat. 1388-143 (hereinafter
OBRA 1990).
2Maura Reynolds, Medicaid Savings Law Mandating Drug Discounts to Cut Spending by $3.5 Billion, L.A. Times, Nov. 20,
1990, at A5.
3Michael F. Conlan, Medicaid Reform Plan Now Law, Manufacturer Rebates Mandated, Drug Topics, Nov. 19, 1990, at
16.
4Reynolds, supra note 2.
5Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Medicaid Drug Rebate Program, at
http://www.cms.gov/medicaid/drugs/drughmpg.asp (last visited Jan. 5, 2004).
3nine states and the District of Columbia cover drugs according to the rules of the rebate program.6 Most
importantly, rebates have generated great ﬁnancial return to the state and federal governments, with a total
of $19.8 billion recouped from drug manufacturers between 1990 and 2000.7 Yet in other ways, the drug
rebate program has done both much less and much more than it promised.
The rebate program has done less because it has failed to reign in the skyrocketing Medicaid expenditures
on prescription drugs. Medicaid outpatient prescription drug costs increased at an average annual rate of
14.8 percent between 1990 and 1997, and 18.1 percent per year from 1997-2000.8 In fact, spending for
prescription drugs has been one of the fastest growing elements of the Medicaid program.9 As a result, by
2003, Medicaid was spending $27.5 billion on prescription drugs for 50.8 million enrollees.10 Thus, while the
rebate program has “saved” Medicaid signiﬁcantly, it has had poor to failing results as a cost containment
tool.
Diﬃculties monitoring the drug manufacturers’ best prices have also detracted from the program’s success.
There are currently numerous lawsuits pending in which states have charged pharmaceutical manufacturers
with overstating their best price and therefore under-rebating the Medicaid program. The Health and
Human Services Oﬃce of Inspector General has instituted ongoing investigations of pharmaceutical pricing
practices.11 Some violations have been detected and remuneration has been made to the states.12 However,
the OIG’s recent audits of state programs suggest that there are many more holes in states’ systems of
6Arizona is excluded. Id.
7Brian K. Bruen, Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, States Strive to Limit Medicaid Expendi-
tures for Prescribed Drugs, (2002), available at http://www.kﬀ.org/medicaid/4030-index.cfm
8Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, Medicaid and the Prescription Drug Benefit (2002) available
at http://www.kﬀ.org/medicaid/4063-index.cfm.
9Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, Medicaid Prescription Drug Benefits: Findings From A
National Survey, 2003 i (2003) available at http://www.kﬀ.org/medicaid/4164.cfm
10Id. at 1.
11The OIG 2004 work plan announced the oﬃce’s intent to investigate federal drug pricing to “determine whether drug
manufacturers are circumventing the intent of the drug rebate legislation.” See HHS Office of Inspector General, Work
Plan Fiscal Year 2004, at 29 available at http://oig.hhs.gov/publications/docs/workplan/2004/Work%20Plan%202004.pdf.
12For example, in 2003, Pﬁzer Inc. agreed to a $49 million multi-state settlement for failure to pay states the rebates due
for its blockbuster drug Lipitor. Pﬁzer Settles Lipitor Case with Pennsylvania, Pitt. Bus. Times, Mar. 3, 2003, available at
http://pittsburgh.bizjournals.com/pittsburgh/stories/2003/03/03/daily37.html
4internal controls that could allow for violations to arise in the future.13 Thus, not only has the program
failed to reign in skyrocketing costs, but reliance on the manipulable term “best price” has made it diﬃcult
to realize the full beneﬁt of the rebates due.
By contrast, the rebate program has done arguably more than promised because many states have leveraged
the power granted in the rebate legislation to negotiate additional rebates and extend the “best price”
provisions to large non-Medicaid populations.14 Several states, including Michigan and Florida, have enacted
legislation requiring manufacturers pay rebates above those required by federal law as a condition of gaining
inclusion on a “preferred drug list.” Maine has created a more sweeping program, which allows the state
to extend the cost beneﬁt of the Medicaid drug rebates to all of its residents who lack prescription drug
insurance coverage—more than 200,000 people.15 Both strategies for expanding the reach of the federal
rebate provisions have been challenged in court by the pharmaceutical industry. The eﬀorts to halt the
programs, however, have not been successful. Most recently, the Supreme Court upheld the Maine program
in the summer of 2003 by a 6-3 vote.16
The propriety of the courts’ decisions and of the use of the rebate program for non-Medicaid populations
has been examined extensively by other articles.17 However, these explorations of legislative intent, while
13For example, OIG reports found generally poor monitoring systems in place that resulted in poor tracking
of outstanding rebates owed and failure to collect interest owed on late payments See eg. Health and Human
Services Office of the Inspector General, Review of the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program in New Hampshire as of
June 30, 2002, A-01-03-00013 (January 2004); Health and Human Services Office of the Inspector General, Review
of Medicaid Drug Rebate Collections State of Vermont Office of Vermont Health Access as of June 30, 2002,
A-01-03-00012 (December 2003); Health and Human Services Office of the Inspector General, Audit of the Medicaid
Drug Rebate Program In Idaho, A-10-03-00008 (October 2003).
14Approximately 9 states now use the Medicaid rebate system to extract additional rebates from pharmaceutical manufac-
turers. Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, supra note 9, at 37.
15Me. Dep’t Human Serv., Healthy Savings on Prescription Drugs: MaineRx Plus (2004), available at
http://www.maine.gov/dhs/mainerx/brochure.pdf.
16Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America v. Walsh (Concannon), 123 S. Ct. 1855 (2003).
17The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), the federal agency in charge of administering the Medicaid pro-
gram, itself has sanctioned the use of the rebate agreement to extract additional rebates for both Medicaid and non-Medicaid
populations so long as the state seeks CMS approval and demonstrates that such a program “furthers the goals and objectives
5generally accurate, do not aim to (and therefore fail to) capture the richness of the legislative history of
the drug rebate law. The legislative history is a story of trench warfare between equally armed foes. It is
also a story of what perhaps is the last major blow taken by the prescription drug industry. With people
everywhere criticizing the recent Medicare drug bill as a sweetheart deal for drug manufacturers, this paper
illustrates how forces once came out against drug industry proﬁts, rather than for them.
Basic Summary of Medicaid and the Medicaid Drug Rebate Law
Before exploring the origins and iterations of the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program, it is useful to review the
general terms of the law as it currently reads and its place within the larger Medicaid program.
Medicaid is a cooperative state-federal program that provides medical care to needy individuals. Under
this scheme, the states administer the delivery of care, while the federal government retains oversight and
contributes matching funds for approved state programs. The federal agency responsible for the Medicaid
program is the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS, formerly known as the Health Care Fi-
nancing Administration or HCFA) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). A state
may receive between 50 and 77 percent of the cost of providing care from the federal government depending
on the state’s per capita income.18
of the Medicaid program.” Letter from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services to State Medicaid Directors, SMDL
#02-014 (Sept. 18, 2002), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/states/letters/smd91802.pdf. Still, this conclusion did not put
the debate on the wisdom of this policy to rest. See Jagan Nicholas Ranjan, Medicaid and the Unconstitutional Dimensions of
Prior Authorization, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 602 (2002); Conrad J. Barrington, Pharmaceutical Research Manufacturers of Amer-
ica v. Concannon and Maine’s Prescription Drug Rebate Statute: A Twenty-First Century Solution to the Medicaid Crisis,
23 Whittier L. Rev. 1127 (Summer 2002); Charles J. Coper, Medically Necessary Drugs at a Reasonable Cost, ALI-ABA 479
(2002).
18Department of Health and Human Services, Federal Medical Assistance Percentages: Fiscal Year 2004 Table,
available at http://aspe.os.dhhs.gov/health/fmap.htm. This percentage range does not reﬂect enhanced federal matching for
the State Children’s Health Improvement Program. It likewise does not account for the temporary percentage increases for
which some states were eligible in 2003 and 2004 pursuant to The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub.
L. No. 108-27, 117 Stat. 752. Id..
6Families with dependent children and disabled individuals who meet income eligibility guidelines may enroll
in Medicaid and obtain medically necessary services. Beyond this basic federally-mandated coverage, states
may opt to expand their Medicaid coverage to additional services and populations. Prescription drug cov-
erage is one medical beneﬁt that may be included by a state in its Medicaid plan. Today, all ﬁfty states
provide a Medicaid prescription drug beneﬁt. Under Medicaid prescription drug plans, Medicaid enrollees
may pick up their prescriptions at any of a number of participating pharmacies. The Medicaid program then
reimburses the pharmacies for these prescriptions.
The rebate program, §1927 of the Social Security Act, codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C. §1396r-8, was enacted to help
contain prescription costs of the State Medicaid programs. In sum, the law requires that drug manufacturers
provide a per unit rebate to State Medicaid programs as a condition of continuing Medicaid coverage of a
manufacturer’s outpatient prescription drugs.19 The agreements dictating the amount of the unit rebate are
established between drug manufacturers and the Secretary of Health and Human Services, acting on behalf
of the States.20 Rebate agreements are eﬀective for one-year and are automatically renewed unless otherwise
terminated by either the Secretary or the participating manufacturer.21
The terms of the rebate agreement are many. Most centrally is the provision dictating the rebate amount. The
method for calculating the rebate amount depends upon the drug product in question. For non-innovator,
19Under the 1992 Veterans Health Care Act, in order to receive reimbursement under the Medicaid program, manufacturers
must also enter into pricing agreements with the Public Health Services (PHS) and the Department of Veterans Aﬀairs (DVA).
The former agreement must provide that the manufacturers oﬀer PHS covered entities discounts on outpatient drugs that are
at least as great as the rebates received by State Medicaid program. The latter agreement with the DVA must provide that
prices for these drugs may not exceed annual federal ceiling prices speciﬁed for these drugs. Veterans Health Care Act of 1992,
Pub. L. No. 102-585, §§ 601-603, 106 Stat. 4943.
2042 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(a). The Secretary may also authorize a state to directly enter into an agreement with a manufacturer if
that agreement provides for rebates at least as large as provided for under the law. 42 U.S.C. §1396r-8(a)(1). It is this section
that has allowed states to enter into supplemental drug rebate agreements such as those litigated in the Florida and Michigan
cases discussed above. See Letter from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services to State Medicaid Directors, supra note
17.
2142 U.S.C. §1396r-(b)(4).
7multiple source drugs22 (a.k.a. generics) the rebate amount per unit is 11% of average manufacturer price23
(AMP) for the rebate period.24 The rebate calculation for single source25 or innovator, multiple source26
drugs is more complex. The basic rebate per unit is equal to the greater of:
a.
Amount by which the average manufacturer price (AMP) during
the quarter for each dosage form and strength of a drug exceeds manufacturer’s best
price,27 or
b.
The minimum rebate percentage of AMP (currently 15.1%
AMP).28
On top of the basic rebate, there may be an “additional rebate” associated with certain single source or
innovator multiple source drugs to account for inﬂation of the AMP since the drug’s introduction into the
consumer market.29 At the end of each rebate period, states must report the total number of units sold of
22A non-innovator, multiple source drug is statutorily deﬁned as a covered outpatient drug for which there are two or more
drug products which are rated by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) as therapeutically equivalent, bioequivalent, and
pharmaceutically equivalent. 42 U.S.C. §1396r-8(k)(7). A non-innovator drug is one that was not originally marketed under a
new drug application approved by the FDA. Id.
23Average manufacturer price (AMP) is statutorily deﬁned as “with respect to a covered outpatient drug of a manufacturer
for a rebate period, the average price paid to the manufacturer for the drug in the United States by wholesalers for drugs
distributed to the retail pharmacy class of trade, after deducting customary prompt pay discounts.” §1396r-8(k)(1). Thus,
AMP does not include direct sales to HMOs and hospitals. AMP is based on actual retail sales data for drug manufacturers. By
contrast, the average wholesale price (AWP) is a published catalogue price put out by the drug manufacturers. Some analogize
AWP to the “sticker price for an automobile, in that manufacturers name the AWP, but few physicians actually buy at the full
AWP or even 95 percent of it.” Joseph P. Newhouse, How Much Should Medicare Pay for Drugs? Health Affairs 89, 95
(2004).
24§1396r-8(c)(3). Prior to January 1, 1994, the rebate was 10% AMP. Id. See also, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services, Unit Rebate Amount (URA) Calculation, available at http://www.cms.gov/Medicaid/drugs/drug12.asp.
25A single source drug is a covered outpatient drug which is produced or distributed under an original new drug application
approved by the Food and Drug Administration. §1396r-8(k)(7).
26An innovator, multiple source drug is a drug that was originally marketed under an original new drug application approved
by the Food and Drug Administration but that now faces generic competition. §1396r-8(k)(7).
29The additional rebate is calculated as follows: 1. Divide the “baseline AMP” (AMP for ﬁrst quarter after the date ﬁrst
marketed) by the “baseline consumer price index-urban (CPI-U)” (the CPI-U for the month prior to the ﬁrst quarter after the
date the drug was ﬁrst marketed); 2. Multiply the result by the CPI-U for the current quarter, providing the AMP based on
cost-of-living; 3. Compare the result in 2 with the AMP for the current quarter. If this amount (in 2) is less than the current
AMP, then a rebate equal to the diﬀerence between current AMP and CPI-U-adjusted AMP (in 2) must be paid to the state
8each outpatient drug to the manufacturers (to enable them to compute the rebate) and to HHS (for record
keeping and audit purposes).30 Using this information, manufacturers pay the rebates directly to the states.
Amounts received by the states are considered a reduction in State Medicaid spending and therefore reduce
the amount of federal matching funds received.31
Manufacturers are responsible for calculating the rebate amount based on their determination of AMP and
best price. To enable HHS to verify the manufacturers’ rebate calculation, participating drug manufacturers
are required to provide the agency a signiﬁcant amount of otherwise proprietary pricing information. Section
(b)(3)(A) provides that within 30 days after the end of each rebate period, a manufacturer must report the
drug’s AMP and best price.32 HHS may then survey wholesalers and other direct recipients of a manufac-
turer’s drugs to conﬁrm this information.33 If a discrepancy is discovered, the manufacturer could face civil
penalties of up to $100,000 for each item of false information.34 HHS may also penalize manufacturers for
failure to provide timely information on AMP or best price.35
In return for their cooperation with the rebate agreement, participating manufacturers are guaranteed cov-
erage of their drugs. However, there are certain restrictions which states can place on prescription drug
coverage. First, certain drugs, including those used for cosmetic purposes, to promote smoking cessation or
fertility, and non-prescription drugs, need not be covered by State Medicaid programs.36 Second, pursuant to
for each unit of the drug sold. If the amount is more than current AMP, there is no additional rebate required.
Note that the methods for calculating baseline AMP and baseline CPI-U has changed across the years. Therefore, for drugs
originally marketed on or before September 30, 1990, baseline AMP is the AMP for the quarter of March 1990 and CPI-U
is equal to the CPI-U value for September 1990. Between September 20, 1990 and October 1, 1993, the baseline AMP was
calculated using the AMP for the ﬁrst full month the product was marketed and the CPI-U was equal to the CPI-U for the
month preceding this month. See Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Rebate Amount (URA) Calculations,
supra note 24.
30§1396r-(8)(b)(2).
31That is, the rebate savings are shared by both the federal and state governments in proportion to the percentage of costs





36§1396r-8(d)(2). The full list of drugs that may be excluded from coverage is found includes: agents when used for anorexia,
weight loss, or weight gain; agents when used to promote fertility; agents when used for cosmetic purposes or hair growth;
agents when used for the symptomatic relief of cough and colds; agents when used to promote smoking cessation; prescription
vitamins and mineral products, except prenatal vitamins and ﬂuoride preparations; nonprescription drugs; covered outpatient
91993 amendments to the original law, states may establish drug formularies. Medicaid formularies must meet
several requirements, and as such only about half of the states use these “preferred drug lists.”37 Similar to
formulary restrictions in practice, but distinguished from formularies under the law, are prior authorization
programs. A state may subject any prescription drug coverage to prior authorization.38 All prior autho-
rization programs must guarantee that physician’s drug authorization requests are handled within 24-hours
of receipt.39 States must also allow for the provision of a 72-hour supply of the non-authorized drug in an
emergency situation.40 The ﬁnal major restrictions states may impose on drug coverage are limitations on
the quantities of pills per prescription or on the number of reﬁlls.41 These quantity restrictions must be
designed to discourage waste or address fraud and abuse.
Despite the general “no reimbursement without rebate” rule, Medicaid will reimburse “non-rebate agree-
ment” drugs when “the availability of the drug is essential to the health of beneﬁciaries,” it is rated 1-A by
the Food and Drug Administration, and either a doctor has obtained approval under a prior authorization
program, or the Secretary of HHS has approved a state’s decision to cover the drug despite the absence of a
rebate agreement.42
The drug rebate law contains several other sections addressing issues related, but peripheral, to the rebate
itself. For example, the law establishes a detailed administrative structure for reviewing and monitoring drug
drugs which the manufacturer seeks to require as a condition of sale that associated tests or monitoring services be purchased
exclusively from the manufacturer or its designee; barbiturates; and benzodiazepines.
37§1396r-8(d)(4). Although the formulary may not exclude outpatient drugs of any manufacturer which has entered into and
complies with a rebate agreement, it may exclude rebate-covered drugs if, based on the FDA-approved labeling, the excluded drug
does not have a signiﬁcant, clinically meaningful therapeutic advantage in terms of safety, eﬀectiveness, or clinical outcome of
such treatment for a speciﬁc disease or population over other drugs included in the formulary and there is a written explanation
(available to the public) of the basis for the exclusion. Still, the state must permit coverage of drugs excluded from their
formulary after prior authorization is given. In addition, the formulary must be developed by a Governor-appointed committee
of physicians, pharmacists, and other appropriate individuals. PDLs have been the subject of the aforementioned lawsuits and
have been met with resistance by some consumer groups who feel the lists restrict access to needed drugs for beneﬁciaries.
38The prior authorization provisions were included in the original law as passed. OBRA 1990, supra note 1, at Sec. 4401,
§1927(d)(5), codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C. §1396r-8(d)(1). Approximately 95 percent of states had prior authorization in 2003. Kaiser





10use. The drug utilization review programs, standard for most insurers, were put in place to assess topics
such as over and underutilization of drugs, prescribing errors and adverse drug eﬀects, and generic substitu-
tion.43 In addition, the issue of pharmacy reimbursement was addressed in the ﬁnal version of OBRA 1990,
with lawmakers placing a moratorium on the reduction of pharmacy reimbursement for covered prescription
drugs.44 The moratorium was repealed in 1993.45
Formidable Opponents
The story of the enactment of the above-summarized provisions cannot be appreciated without an under-
standing of the characters central to its passage. Because of the multitude of players and constituents
involved, a legislative battle can perhaps never be accurately reduced to a contest of two wills. Yet the his-
tory of the Medicaid drug rebate program seems suited to such a mythic framing: how the persistent Senator
from Arkansas slew the multi-headed Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Association dragon. As such, before
going into the details of hearings and ﬂoor statements, press releases and phone calls, it is only appropriate
to explain the passions ignited on either side of the table.
Senator David Pryor
David Hampton Pryor was born in Arkansas on August 29, 1934. Just three years out of college, he was
ﬁrst elected to public oﬃce in 1960, winning a seat in the Arkansas House of Representatives. Building a
reputation as a reform-minded liberal, Pryor soon gained attention of the Arkansas voters and was elected
to the U.S. House of Representatives in 1966, where he served three terms. In the House, Pryor was known
as a “crusader for the elderly.”46 In fact, when Pryor tried and failed to establish a House Committee on
43§1396r-8(g).
44OBRA 1990, supra note 1 at §1927(f). Although pharmacists and their trade representatives were present and active
in many of the debates surrounding the drug rebate legislation, this paper will not focus on their claims as related to the
prescription drug bills. However, it is important to note that this constituency was impacted by the drug reimbursement
changes in OBRA 1990.
45Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993, supra note 28, at Title XIII, § 13602(a)(1).
46David Pryor, in Politics in America: Members of Congress in Washington and At Home 67 (Alan Ehrenhalt ed.,
11Aging, he “formed his own ‘special’ aging committee in a trailer parked at a nearby gas station, and began
issuing news releases.”47 Despite this dedication, Pryor lost his reelection bid in 1972. Quick to rebound
from defeat, however, Pryor won the Arkansas gubernatorial race in 1974, and before long he was back in
Washington, a junior Senator.48
Senator David Pryor initially served on the Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry Committee. In 1984, he
gained a seat on the Finance Committee, generally recognized as one of the most prestigious panels in
Congress.49 Still, in his early Senate years, many felt Pryor had yet to ﬁnd his niche. The Congressional
Quarterly (CQ) publication of Politics in America observed, “Pryor is a natural salesman who, after more
than eight years in the Senate, has yet to settle on a product to sell that seems worthy of his talents. For
all his considerable personal charm and ﬂair for publicity, he has not become a well-known ﬁgure on major
issues.”50 In fact, CQ would later describe Pryor’s early career as one of “relatively low-proﬁle labors and
middling success.”51
But in 1988, Senator Pryor began to get more passionately interested in issues surrounding the elderly that
had won him attention in the House. Pryor identiﬁed the high cost of prescription drugs as one of the biggest
problems burdening seniors. As far as the drug companies went, he had little sympathy. He observed, “I
frankly think there’s a lot of greed out there...[Drug companies] say they need to spend all this money on
research and I just don’t buy that.”52 This distaste for the drug companies, or more neutrally, his rediscov-
ered dedication to lowering drug costs for seniors, landed Pryor in 1989 in the position of Chairman of the
Congressional Quarterly, Inc. 1982).
47David Pryor, in Politics in America: Members of Congress in Washington and At Home 74 (Alan Ehrenhalt ed.,
Congressional Quarterly, Inc. 1984).
48Pryor was elected to the Senate in 1978 and began serving his term in January 1979. Id.
49Pryor was also a member of the Governmental Aﬀairs Committee and the Select Committee on Ethics. Id.
50David Pryor, in Politics in America: Members of Congress in Washington and At Home 70 (Alan Ehrenhalt ed.,
Cong. Q., Inc. 1990).
51David Pryor, in Politics in America: Members of Congress in Washington and At Home 81 (Phil Duncan ed., Cong.
Q., Inc. 1992).
52Julie Rovner, Drug Industry Discount to Medicaid Not the Bitter Pill as Prescribed, Cong. Q. Wkly. Rep., Oct. 6, 1990
at 3220.
12Senate Special Committee on Aging.53 Leading this group, Pryor continued to drive bills to reduce drug
costs, vehemently attacking drug industry leaders. The award for this persistence came in the form of the
drug rebate provision of 1990, the focal point of this paper.
To further illustrate the Senator’s resolve on this issue, however, it is interesting to explore Pryor’s actions
vis-` a-vis the drug industry even after passage of the drug rebate bill. Pryor was not one to be content with
a single legislative win. As one executive in the pharmaceutical industry wrote in October 1991, “Senator
Pryor is not at all satisﬁed with the enactment of the Medicaid Drug Rebate bill and is still after our in-
dustry.”54 In fact, Pryor’s rants against the pharmaceutical industry did not stop, but arguably grew more
heated across the years following the Medicaid rebates. Only months after the legislation’s passage, Pryor
hammered away at brand name drug companies, accusing them of shifting their abusive practices to other
populations, even “on the backs of our Nation’s soldier’s and veterans...rather than slightly trim excessive
proﬁts or cut back on huge marketing budgets.”55 Pryor painted the drug industry as a deceitful and devious
bunch, abusing patent protection and using the proﬁts to “subsidize lavish and extravagant drug manufac-
turer marketing campaigns which have little or no educational value for health care professionals.”56 The
pharmaceutical manufacturers were “the robber barons of the American health care system.”57 By 1993,
even the Senator himself acknowledged that he “may sound like an old broken record on this subject [of the
cost of prescription drugs].”58 Still, he persisted.
From 1991 through the end of his legislative career in 1996, Senator Pryor introduced an additional two
bills aimed at containing prescription drug costs, and spoke on the Senate ﬂoor nearly a dozen times on the
topic. Among his varied accomplishments across his 17 year tenure in the Senate, it was the battle against
53David Pryor, in Politics in America: Members of Congress in Washington and At Home 70 (Alan Ehrenhalt ed.,
Cong. Q., Inc. 1990).
54C. Joseph Stetler, The Pharmaceutical Industry in Review: How We Got to Where We Are, 26 Medical Marketing &
Media 11 (1991).
55137 Cong. Rec. S2711-01 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1991)(statement of Sen. David Pryor).
56138 Cong. Rec. S17329-02 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1992)(statement of Sen. David Pryor).
57137 Cong. Rec. S2711-01(daily ed. Mar. 6, 1991)(statement of Sen. David Pryor).
58139 Cong. Rec. S11763 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1993)(statement of Sen. David Pryor).
13the drug industry that largely deﬁned his career. “He never stopped ﬁghting to keep drug prices down for
elderly patients,” Senator Chris Dodd observed, in a speech on the Senate ﬂoor bidding Pryor farewell.59
Senator Carl Levin’s “goodbye” comments were similar: “As chairman of the Aging Committee, he fought
price gouging by the pharmaceutical companies and pushed legislation to make drug companies give their
most favorable prices to Medicare and Medicaid recipients.”60 So too the remarks of Senator Jim Exon:
“A leader in keeping pharmaceutical prices low, Senator Pryor has fought long and hard to make sure that
Americans do not pay for the low prices pharmaceutical companies charge other countries for their products.
Because of his leadership, the Medicaid program instituted a prescription drug rebate program so that drugs
could be purchased at a more favorable rate.”61
It was this undying commitment, the belief that the drug companies could always do more for the American
consumers, which Pryor brought with him to the drug rebate debate.
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association
Senator Pryor’s determination was matched by a formidable opponent. The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
Association (PMA, now the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America or PhRMA) was incor-
porated in 1958 to represent the interests of research-based pharmaceutical companies.62 In 1989-90, PMA
had a membership of over 100 brand name pharmaceutical companies, or about 60 companies if subsidiaries
59142 Cong. Rec. S11956-01 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996)(statement of Sen. Chris Dodd).
60142 Cong. Rec. S12252-01 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1996)(statement of Sen. Carl Levin).
61142 Cong. Rec. S11265-03 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996)(statement of Sen. Jim Exon).
62Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association changed its name to Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers Association
in 1994 in response to government health reform, which drug manufacturers felt would threaten their research capacity. The
name change sought to highlight the importance of the research element of member companies’ work. Victor Ostrowidski, A
New Look at the PMA, American Druggist, June 1994, at 11.
14were not included.63 Worldwide sales of PMA companies were $46.2 billion in 1988 and $50.1 billion in
1989.64 The drug companies’ investment in research and development topped that of any other U.S. indus-
try and was increasing steadily, quadrupling in the 1980s to $8.2 billion in 1990.65 By 1988, combined PMA
member-company R&D expenditures surpassed that of the National Institutes of Health.66
Although individual member companies participated in the rebate debate and testiﬁed before Congress,
PMA largely served as the mouthpiece for the uniﬁed group. Mr. Gerald J. Mossinghoﬀ was the ﬁgure atop
PMA to direct this assault. Gerald Mossinghoﬀ was a lawyer by training with a background in engineering.
He had been named PMA President in 1985 after stepping down as Assistant Secretary of Commerce and
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks.67 When PMA selected Mossinghoﬀ as its leader, his credentials
in the patent ﬁeld eclipsed his lack of direct experience in the pharmaceutical industry. What’s more, Moss-
inghoﬀ’s deeply held beliefs on the importance of protecting the incentive to innovate meshed perfectly with
the goals of the Association. In 1987 he wrote, “For the private sector pharmaceutical industry, which has
been the primary source of new therapies for the past four decades, there is little incentive to provide an
ever-increasing commitment to research unless there are reasonable expectations of ﬁnancial return.”68
More than previous PMA leaders, Mossinghoﬀ was eager to take an activist stance in promoting the PMA
agenda. One former PMA executive observed, “His aim was clear—to make PMA one of the most, if not
the most, eﬀective trade associations in Washington.”69 Under his leadership, PMA stepped up its eﬀorts
to improve the public image of research based drug companies, launching for the ﬁrst time an all out public
relations campaign. The campaign focused on three themes: the value of R&D, the cost-eﬀectiveness of
63Pharm. Mfrs. Ass’n, 1989 Annual Report 13 (1990).
64Pharm. Mfrs. Ass’n, 1991 Annual Report 4 (1992); Pharm. Mfrs. Ass’n, 1989 Annual Report 4.
65Pharm. Mfrs. Ass’n, 1989 Annual Report 4 (1990).
66Pharm. Mfrs. Ass’n, 1989 Annual Report 4 (1990).
67Michael Conlan, PMA Chief Battles Formularies, Wants More Generics Tested, Drug Topics, Mar. 19, 1990, at 38.
68Gerald J. Mossinghoﬀ, Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies: the Need for Improved Patent Protection Worldwide,
2 J.L.Tech. 307 (1987).
69William C. Cray, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association: The First Thirty Years 293 (1989).
15drugs, and the need for new medication development to promote the health of all Americans.70 By the late
1980s, the communications program was running full throttle, ready to respond to any political criticism or
legislative attack on the industry or its members.
Despite its signiﬁcant money and power, PMA was wary to take on a ﬁght against Senator Pryor. In fact,
Pryor was one of the last Senators the drug companies would have wanted to have against them. In the
Senate, Pryor was personally popular. He was moderate in politics, Southern in manners, and overall a “hell
of a nice guy.”71 In fact, in 1989 his peers’ elected him Secretary of the Democratic Conference, the third-
ranking position in the Democratic leadership. According to one Pryor aide, “everyone loved him...and he
was not an ideologue. So if he was mad, they all knew that some real substance must be there behind the
anger.”72 Therefore, when Pryor’s anger came crashing down against the drug companies, most Senators
were content to sit back and let him push the issue as far as he could.73 The pharmaceutical companies were
intent on making sure he couldn’t push the issue far. There was simply too much at stake.
Thus, long before the ﬁrst hearing on Pryor’s Medicaid rebate bills, it was clear that any bill would emerge
only after a prolonged and bloody battle between two heavily armed opponents.
Legislative History Proper
From the Ashes of a “Catastrophe”
The ﬁrst hearings about Medicaid prescription drug rebates weren’t about Medicaid at all. Rather, the idea
70PMA had used some advertising to advance its public image in the past, but the ﬁrst coordinated public relations campaign
did not occur until 1986 or so. Id. at 296.
71Arkansas Ency., David Pryor, available at http://www.geocities.com/arkencyclo/wiki/David Pryor/
72Telephone Interview with Christopher C. Jennings, Former Deputy Staﬀ Director, Senate Special Committee on Aging,
(Feb. 12, 2004).
73Id.
16for a Medicaid drug rebate arose from the ashes of a Medicare legislative debacle referred to in short as
Medicare Catastrophic.
Medicare Catastrophic ironically was not so named because of its horrible demise. Rather, the Medicare
Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1998 was conceived as an extension to Medicare insurance coverage, designed
to provide protection to Medicare beneﬁciaries against extremely high (“catastrophic”) costs of severe illness.
In addition, Medicare Catastrophic added an outpatient drug beneﬁt to the Medicare program. The drug
program had a basic deductible and co-payment structure common in many other Medicare and private
insurance plans. Speciﬁcally, Medicare enrollees who satisﬁed an annual deductible would be required to pay
a percentage coinsurance on outpatient prescription drugs. In return, Medicare would pick up the remaining
cost, namely 50 percent in 1991, 60 percent in 1992, and 80 percent in 1993 and years thereafter.74
At ﬁrst, the bill received support from sponsors and interest groups. Upon passage in the House, Repre-
sentatives hailed it as “the greatest improvement in Medicare in twenty years,” and a “great bill for the
elderly.”75 Every major retiree organization, from the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP)
to the National Association of Retired Federal Employees, oﬃcially threw its support behind the law.76
AARP’s Bulletin hailed Catastrophic “in most laudatory terms, describing it variously as ‘a watershed,’ ‘a
victory for the elderly,’ and protection ‘from the ravages of acute catastrophic illness.”’77
The initial praise was short-lived. Soon after enactment, Medicare Catastrophic began its path toward
repeal. In an embarrassing turn of events for seniors’ groups who had supported the legislation, wealthy
seniors began to vehemently and vocally protest the new legislation. Under the new law, a large percentage
74Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988, P.L. 100-360, 102 Stat 683.
75Spencer Rich, Catastrophic Care Bill Clears House, 328 to 72; Medicare Expansion Likely to Pass Senate Soon, Wash.
Post, June 3, 1988, at A3.
76133 Cong. Rec. S15114-01 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1987)(List of Group Endorsements).
77Richard Himelfarb, Catastrophic Politics 58 (Penn. St. U. Press 1995).
17of wealthier beneﬁciaries would be required to pay a surtax to maintain their Medicare beneﬁts. In 1989, that
surtax could be as much as $800 per person.78 Moreover, these higher premiums did not assure Medicare’s
solvency: the Congressional Budget Oﬃce projected the new drug beneﬁt alone would have a budgetary
shortfall of approximately $2.8 billion over its ﬁrst four years of operation.79
CBO attributed the drug beneﬁt deﬁcit, at least in part, to the increasing price of prescription drugs.80
Medicare drug prices were to be based on average wholesale price per unit—a price that, by most all assess-
ments, was far higher than that actually paid by any purchaser. The Health Care Financing Administration
would have no authority to negotiate prices below this average.
In an attempt to save the prescription drug portion of the bill, deﬂate its price tag, and look more generally
at drug pricing issues, the Senate Special Committee on Aging, chaired by Senator David Pryor, convened a
two-part hearing, entitled, “Skyrocketing Prescription Drug Prices.” Part One was held on July 18, 1989 and
was entitled, “Are We Getting Our Money’s Worth?” Part Two took place four months later on November
16, 1989 and focused on “Turning a Bad Deal into a Good Deal.” These hearings did nothing to reverse
Catastrophic’s tumble toward repeal, which eventually occurred on December 13, 1989.81 By contrast, the
hearings were instrumental in laying the foundation for the Medicaid drug rebate legislation.
The Early Hearings: Skyrocketing Prescription Drug Prices
On July 18, 1989, the Senate Special Committee on Aging called on witnesses to help examine drug pricing
78Spencer Rich & Tom Kenworth, Sen. McCain Vows Fight on Medicare ‘Catastrophic’ Beneﬁts Partially Supported, Wash.
Post, Nov. 19, 1989, at A10.
79Julie Rovner, Panel May Pave Way for Death of Catastrophic-Cost Laws, Cong. Q. Wkly. Rept., July 15, 1989, Vol.
47, No. 28.
80Id.
81Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Repeal Act of 1989, Pub. L. 101-234, 103 Stat. 1979.
18issues related to Catastrophic.82 The witness panel was comprised of eight people possessing a variety of
experiences with drug pricing policy, both inside and outside of Medicare. Presumably, it was the intent of
the committee that witnesses with non-Medicare experience might have innovative cost-reducing suggestions
that could be applied to Catastrophic Drug Insurance proposal. Yet as each witness spoke, the hearing
began to take a diﬀerent twist. The discussion of drug pricing became more global. Rather than a strategy
session to save or strengthen the Catastrophic Drug Insurance proposal, the July 1989 hearings were more
like a grand jury trial of the drug industry and their pricing policies.
From the start the drug companies faced an uphill battle. The stark drug price increases of the 1980s
screamed out to Pryor. Moreover, the conclusions of a Special Aging Committee majority staﬀ report pro-
vided additional backing for this basic complaint. The brieﬁng paper entitled, “Prescription Drug Prices:
Are We Getting Our Money’s Worth?” presented nine conclusions of the staﬀ’s research:
♣
The bulk of research and development by prescription drug manufacturers pro-
duces insigniﬁcant new compounds that add little or nothing to drug therapies already marketed;
♣ Prescription drug manufacturers charge the public high prices for new drugs that duplicate existing and
generally less expensive, drug therapies;
♣ Present governmental incentives to spur true innovation by pharmaceutical manufacturers appear to
have failed;
♣ Prescription drug price increases more than tripled the rate of inﬂation in the economy from 1981 to
1988;
♣ Prescription drug manufacturers have opted to expand their market by charging penthouse prices to
82Hearing on Skyrocketing Prescription Drug Prices before the Sen. Spec. Comm. on Aging, 101st Cong. 457 (1989)[here-
inafter Aging Hearings].
19compensate for the poverty of their innovation;
♣ Citizens of most countries of the world pay less than U.S. consumers for their prescription drugs;
♣ There are two domestic markets in the U.S. for most big-selling prescription drugs: a price competitive
market characterized by deep discounts oﬀ the published list price, and a high-priced market where retail
customers, Medicare and Medicaid purchase their prescription drugs;
♣ Actions by insurers and Medicaid programs to reduce drug costs by cutting pharmacy reimbursement
have hurt pharmacies but have had little eﬀect on prescription drug prices;
♣ Congress has previously granted the Executive Branch authority which may be useful in obtaining fair
drug prices from manufacturers that refuse to negotiate single source drug prices or engage in competitive
bidding.83
In his opening statement, Pryor candidly described the data and the above conclusions. In sum, he asserted
that the American prescription drug consumer was getting a bad deal.
The data amassed in support of his position was not the only thing that fueled Pryor’s antipathy toward
the drug industry. Pryor was also frustrated by his personal interactions with the industry even before the
hearing began. Pryor had invited 18 drug manufacturers to present testimony on the topic of drug pricing.
Only one of those companies, Amgen, agreed to appear. Pryor vociferously chastised the drug industry for
their lack of cooperation, ticking oﬀ the names of each non-participating invitee. “When it comes to boasting
of their proﬁts to Wall Street, the drug companies can be heard loud and clear, but hey are awfully quiet
when it comes to discussing the prices they charge on Main Street,” Pryor stated.84
83Staff of Senate Spec. Comm. on Aging, Prescription Drug Prices: Are We Getting Our Money’s Worth?,
(Comm. Print No. 101-49 (1989)). Subsequent to the release of this report after the July hearing, PMA composed a
white paper of its own on November 15, 1989, just a day before the second hearing on drug pricing. PMA President Gerald
Mossinghoﬀ urged Chairman Pryor to “consider the facts rather than the ﬂawed conclusions of the Committee majority staﬀ.”
Aging Hearing, supra note 82, at 457 (letter from Gerald J. Mossinghoﬀ to the Honorable David Pryor, Chairman, Select
Committee on Aging). PMA’s report, entitled, “America’s Pharmaceutical Research Companies—A Cost-Eﬀective Source of
Important New Medicine,” objected to ﬁve elements of the majority staﬀ’s analysis and concluded that the report far overstated
the “me-too factor” in the drug industry. Id. at 458-59.
84Aging Hearings, supra note 82 at 1 (1989)(Opening Statement by Senator David Pryor, Chairman). In an advisory article
to the industry published in October 1991, the author noted the leverage Pryor gained by advertising the absence of drug
20Luckily, the ﬁrst witness was friendlier to the interests of the Senator and in fact gave him more fodder
for his ﬁght with the industry. Mr. Dennis Styrsky, chief of the Pharmaceutical Products Division at the
Department of Veterans Aﬀairs (VA), testiﬁed on the VA drug procurement policy. The drug acquisition
program had successfully secured discounts on single-source drugs ranging from 22 to 90 percent oﬀ of av-
erage wholesale price. By contrast, Medicare (under the Catastrophic plan) and Medicaid were required to
pay AWP for their drugs. HCFA and the VA therefore represented the two ends of a spectrum of drug prices,
with hospitals and other insurers falling somewhere in the middle. Yet, Pryor observed, HCFA and the VA
were both government purchasers, were they not? Why did they pay diﬀerent amounts? Pryor attached to
this price diﬀerential. He would return frequently to the comparable across the next year.85
While the VA testiﬁed that it had little diﬃculty lowering drug prices, State Medicaid oﬃces were largely
stuck paying AWP. The next witness, Mr. Winston Barton, Director of the Kansas Medicaid program, ex-
plained his state’s attempts at reducing drug costs to a more aﬀordable level. New state legislation allowed
the Medicaid program to establish a bidding program, under which drug companies were invited to place a
price bid for each of their prescription drugs. The company oﬀering the lowest bid price within a class of
therapeutically equivalent drugs gained the right to be the sole distributor for that class. Unfortunately, Mr.
Barton commented, “the major obstacle in starting this program was the strong resistance from the major
pharmaceutical companies,” and only a half-dozen drug products had been bid on.86 Savings, therefore, were
limited. The next witness expressed similar frustrations. An operator of a retail pharmaceutical purchasing
companies at the hearings. In looking forward to possible additional hearings on revisions to the rebate bill, the author stated:
“When Pryor schedules these hearings, and he will, I believe it is imperative that, in addition to PMA, representatives of three
or four companies be present to testify. If we are afraid to appear, you can be sure that Pryor will exploit our absence and that
no one in the Congress is going to give us any support. We do have a great story to tell and some strong points to make. But
we have to tell it in person. Not by proxy, not by letter, and not by advertisements.” Stetler, supra note 54.
85There is some question of the wisdom and accuracy of comparing the VA and HCFA-procured prices. The Veterans
Administration is not an insurance program, but directly purchases and delivers prescription drugs. By contrast, HCFA in
Medicaid (and in Medicare, had Catastrophic been implemented) are the ﬁnancers of a program wherein each individual
beneﬁciary obtains drugs from independent pharmacies and the government reimburses the pharmacies for this cost. Some
people, including the HCFA administrator, felt that this distinction made the prices procured in the two programs incomparable
and felt that Pryor’s persistent comparison of Medicaid, Medicare and VA prices was inappropriate. See e.g. Aging Hearings,
supra note 82, at 27.
86Id. at 41.
21group, he too had tried and largely failed in gaining participation of brand-name drug manufacturers. Two
innovative strategies to lower drug costs had been thwarted by uncooperative drug manufacturers.
Three witnesses had testiﬁed at this point. Two had illustrated the unwillingness of pharmaceutical man-
ufacturer to support cost containment policies, while another had proven that, yes, lower prices existed on
the market. This “constructive education of the committee” primed them to receive the head of the Phar-
maceutical Manufacturers’ Association.87
In his ﬁve minutes of testimony, Gerald Mossinghoﬀ, PMA President, touted the beneﬁts of the new drugs
being developed by member companies. He highlighted the associated costs for the development process and
the fact that PMA member companies devoted a higher percentage of their sales to research and development
than any other high-technology industry.88 Drug prices may seem high, but the product was worth the cost.
Any reduction in these costs would only cut into innovative drug discoveries in the future.
Then he went negative, criticizing the numbers that Senator Pryor and his committee had found in their
research. He “respectfully submit[ted]” that the number of me-too drugs was signiﬁcantly inﬂated; that the
amount spent on advertising by pharmaceutical companies was likewise overstated; and that the comparison
of drug prices around the world was misleading when accounting for the average earning power in each of
the comparison countries.89 He noted that while individual drug prices may have gone up, the share of each
health-care dollar expenditure attributable to prescription drug purchases had decreased from 12.4 percent
in 1965 to 6.8 percent in 1987. As “respectfully” as he delivered his critique, Mr. Mossinghoﬀ did not please
the Committee Chair.
Pryor’s rebuke was harsh and directed at both PMA and the absent member companies. He criticized the
general attitude of a drug industry that didn’t feel Congress had “a role in looking at the prices that our con-
87Id. at 118.
88In 1990, PMA members spent $8.1 billion on research and development. Pharm. Mfrs. Ass’n, 1989 Annual Report 13
(1990).
89Aging Hearings, supra note 82, at 119.
22sumers and taxpayers are paying for prescription drugs, which are necessities of life.”90 He was unrelenting
on the question of the 88 percent rise in drug prices since 1981, demanding an explanation that would satisfy
his constituents. He asked about price increases after patent expiration and why after a drug company had
its “patent for 17 years, [and] made a lot of dough on that particular drug, and the price still goes up?”91
When Mossinghoﬀ’s initial replies were unsatisfying to the Senator, the PMA President retreated to the
fact that because of antitrust law “PMA cannot get involved in how our companies price.”92 This reply of
course, only served to egg on Pryor who had expressed to PMA his preference for individual manufacturer
testimony over an Association presentation, “as the Association is neither responsible nor accountable for
manufacturers’ decisions with respect to pricing of prescription drugs.”93
Although sprinkled with comments from other Senators, the discussion between Senator Pryor and PMA
President Mossinghoﬀ continued for some twenty pages of transcript, rehashing the pricing questions and
examining the favorable tax treatment of manufacturers’ expensive research and development pursuits. The
exhaustive exchange left Pryor conﬁdent about one thing: if prices kept going up as they had been, Congress,
with his leadership, was going to take action.
Mossinghoﬀ may have been the centerpiece of the hearing, but he was not the last witness of the day. That
position was given to the Chairman of Amgen, George B. Rathmann. The Chairman had become more
subdued when Mr. Rathmann ﬁnally took to speak. The testimony of three other witnesses had put space




93In a June 14, 1989 letter to Mr. Gerald J. Mossinghoﬀ of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Association, Chairman
Pryor and Ranking Member John Heinz expressed their concerns with PMA representation at the hearing in lieu of individual
manufacturers. They wrote, “The Association, in contrast with its member ﬁrms, lacks speciﬁc knowledge of ﬁrms’ pricing
policies, or the reasons behind these decisions, and is prohibited by anti-trust statutes from participating in price-setting.
Inasmuch as the Association is neither responsible nor accountable for manufacturers decisions with respect to pricing of
prescription drugs, we believe the Committee’s limited hearing time will be most fruitfully employed in frank dialogue with
company decision-makers, based on actual pricing data.” Aging Hearings, supra note 82, at 373-74.
94The other panelists at the July 18, 1989 hearing included Joseph Thomas II of Purdue University School of Pharmacy;
Bruce Laughrey, president of Medi-Span; Louis B. Hays, Acting Administrator of HCFA. Id. at 176-219.
23drug manufacturer seemed to engulf his negative feelings toward the industry that had been unleashed upon
PMA. Mr. Rathmann’s testimony concluded the hearing, and Senator Pryor sent him oﬀ with a charge:
“I hope that you can talk to some of your colleagues who are in the pharmaceutical business, some of the
manufacturers to convince them that we don’t have horns, that we’re looking for answers, that we hope that
they will participate with us in some of these future discussions.”95
The hearing adjourned at 1:21 p.m., but the issues it raised did not disappear. Instead they hovered over
the Capitol like the swampy D.C. summer air. On July 31, Senator Pryor brought his observations from the
hearings to the rest of the Senate.96 While his ﬂoor speech perhaps presented no new revelations, his message
was ﬁrm. This was something he wasn’t going to quit pushing. “Are we getting our money’s worth?” the
hearing had asked. Pryor’s answer resounded: absolutely not.
A Shift to Medicaid Drug Costs
By the second of the two hearings on Prescription Drug Prices on November 16, 1988, the Medicare Catas-
trophic drug beneﬁt was all but dead. Chairman David Pryor admitted as much and reframed the policy
context of the discussion. Instead of analyzing drug prices for the purpose of getting a fair deal for Medi-
care, he shifted his attention to Medicaid drug spending. The change made good policy sense. After all,
approximately 3.1 million Medicare beneﬁciaries (or 9 percent of all Medicare enrollees) also qualiﬁed for
Medicaid beneﬁts.97 If there was to be no drug beneﬁt through Medicare, Pryor was to assure that the
95Id. at 229.
96136 Cong. Rec. S.9058-02 (daily ed. July 31, 1989)(statement of Sen. David Pryor).
97These data are based on the number of Medicaid beneﬁciaries in the 65 and older eligibility group. They do not include
individuals who may have received Medicare coverage due to disability. Therefore, the percentage of “dual eligibles” (people on
Medicare who also qualiﬁed for Medicaid) was probably slightly higher than this ﬁgure. See Centers for Medicare and Med-
icaid Services, Number of Medicaid Persons Served (Beneﬁciaries), by Eligibility Group: Fiscal Years 1975-1999, 2001 Medi-
care and Medicaid Statistical Supplement, available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/review/supp/2001/table88.pdf; Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Number of Enrollees in the Medicare Hospital and/or Supplementary Medical Insur-
ance Programs, By Type of Coverage and Type of Entitlement: July 1, 1966-1999, 2001 Medicare and Medicaid Statistical
Supplement available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/review/supp/2001/table5a.pdf.
24states providing drug coverage through Medicaid could continue to ﬁnance their programs and support the
most desperate segment of the elderly population.
Pryor’s concern for the ﬁnancial viability of State Medicaid drug programs was well placed. Drug coverage
under Medicaid was optional, but all but two states, Alaska and Wyoming, elected to oﬀer the beneﬁt. Yet
while states covered prescription drugs, the ﬁnancial security of the programs was unsteady in November
1989. States were in a time of sharp ﬁscal decline, and 33 states would face budget deﬁcits by 1990.98 As the
second fastest rising cost in state government budgets in the 1980s, Medicaid was a signiﬁcant contributor to
these deﬁcits.99 In turn, the third highest driver of Medicaid expenditures was prescription drugs, estimated
at $3.5 billion in 1989.100
States were pursuing a variety of strategies to decrease the cost of their Medicaid drug programs. Drug
cost-control measures included co-payments, restrictive formularies, annual or monthly limits on number of
prescriptions or prescription reimbursement per enrollee, and reduced reimbursement to dispensing phar-
macists. By 1988, twenty states had co-payments in eﬀect, twelve states capped the number of annual
prescriptions or expenditures per enrollee, and at least 22 used formularies.101
States were also exploring policies to directly force drug companies to lower the sticker price on their drugs.
As described in the earlier hearing, Medicaid was paying average wholesale price for its drugs—on the order
of 30 to 40 percent more than most other drug purchasers.102 As of the November hearings, two states—
Alabama and Kansas—had passed legislation allowing Medicaid administrators to negotiate lower prices with
drug manufacturers.103 To provide the states with leverage in negotiating drug rebates, the laws also gave
98Jean Donovan Gilman, Medicaid and the Costs of Federalism, 1984-1992 163 (1998).
99136 Cong. Rec. S5811-01 (daily ed. May 8, 1990)(statement of Sen. David Pryor).
100Id.
101Stephen B. Soumerai and Dennis Ross-Degnan, Experience of State Drug Beneﬁt Programs, Health Affairs, 40, 41 (Fall
1990). Other studies reported that in 1988 only 4 state drug formularies could be deemed “completely open.” Id.
102To be precise, Medicaid reimbursement for single source and innovator multiple source drugs was based on pharmacists
Estimated Acquisition Cost. In most states, this was equal to Average Wholesale Price minus 10 percent. Aging Hearings,
supra note 82, at 223.
103Staff of Senate Spec. Comm. on Aging, Skyrocketing Prescription Drug Prices: Turning a Bad Deal into a
Fair Deal, (Comm. Print No. 101-69, at 22 (1990)). Twelve other states were exploring this possibility as of November 1989.
25administrators the authority to exclude non-participating drug manufacturers from the Medicaid formularies.
Still, the states were having diﬃculty employing this tactic against drug companies who acted in concert and
refused to submit bid prices.104 In fact, the state threat was somewhat empty: it was politically infeasible
to withhold brand-name drugs without generic equivalents from Medicaid enrollees. Drug companies played
up this fact in their lobby to prohibit further state action. “Such policies amount to second-class medical
treatment for the poor,” they argued.105 States were having diﬃculty negotiating rebates, but many didn’t
know where else to turn. Costs had to be reduced.
And so, in the November 1989 hearings, the Special Committee on Aging turned to what they could do to
help the Medicaid programs. Members heard the plight of Medicaid directors and program administrators.
They heard the stories of two seniors who were having trouble covering their prescription drug costs. They
listened as directors of organizations dedicated to making drugs more accessible described how any success
in gaining lower bulk purchase prices were counteracted by subsequent drug price increases. There were
neither drug companies nor PMA representatives testifying at this session. Instead, the Committee Chair
drew attention to those in need of help and indicated his intent to provide that support.
“The drug manufacturers may not know it, but they are digging themselves
into a very deep hole. The Congress is not going to stand around and watch
drug prices in the community...go up 400 percent, 238 percent...We’re not
going to stand here and watch people in Italy pay 41 cents...and $2.38 here.
This system is not going to permit that. What we do with this problem
is another question, but there is no doubt that something is going to be
done.”106
A Medicaid Drug Rebate Bill
The drafting and introduction of PAPPA (S. 2605)
Georgia would enact similar law before the close of 1989.
104136 Cong. Rec. S5811-01 (daily ed. May 8, 1990)(statement of Sen. David Pryor).
105Milt Freudenheim, Price Revolt Spreading on Prescription Drugs, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1989, at D1.
26By January 1990, Senator Pryor had begun to delve into legislative strategies to “do something” about
the problem of prescription drug costs. Although he remained concerned about escalating drug costs in all
sectors, a Medicaid-based proposal seemed the best place to start. Medicaid was the single largest drug
purchaser, and it was paying the highest drug prices.107 The hearings from the previous year informed a
January Aging Committee majority staﬀ report that oﬀered three options for legislation.108 The options
were:
1.
“Voluntary Educational Program”: Directs HHS to establish a
National Pharmacy and Therapeutics (P&T) Committee to assess drug therapeutic
equivalence. The therapeutic equivalence list would be given to the states to assist them,
at their option, in negotiating drug prices with manufacturers.
2. “Flexible Mandate”: Requires States to join multi-state buying groups to negotiate prices of single
source drugs with manufacturers. These buying groups would be required to accept the low bid in each
therapeutic category established by the National P&T Committee. States would pay pharmacies AWP and
obtain a rebate from the manufacturer equal to the diﬀerence between the negotiated price and AWP. States
which have their own negotiating program prior to the statutory deadline for joining a buying group could
continue to operate this program (the “grandfather clause”) subject to certain fundamental rules (to be set
forth in the ﬁnal legislation.
3. “Mandatory National Medicaid Buying Program”: Require States participate in a single national buying
group that would negotiate drug prices with manufacturers on their behalf. Rebate structure would be similar
to that described in Option 2.109
107There was some objection to calling Medicaid the “largest drug purchaser” for the program itself was not a direct purchaser
of prescription drugs but reimbursed individual retailers. Still, this was the rhetoric that Pryor used in describing the decision
to go after Medicaid drug costs. Note also, this reference is to “single purchaser.” Combined other industry sectors were larger
purchasers (e.g., HMO sales were 20-30% of drug company sales but any individual company represented only 0.05% to 0.06%
of a company’s business). Id. at 226.
108Comm. Print No. 101-69, supra note 103.
109Id. at 17-18.
27It took some time to hammer out the details and settle on one of the above options. Finally, on May 8,
Senator Pryor took the ﬂoor to preview his Medicaid drug price legislation. He began:
“Madam President, I rise this afternoon with good news and bad news. The bad
news is that we face a smoldering national crisis. The good news is that I believe I
have at least part of the solution in a bill I will introduce on Thursday. The crisis I
am referring to has been created by years of excessive increases in prescription drug
prices. It is a crisis of aﬀordability. I am sure there are many reasons for it, but in
my mind one central reason has been the greed of drug manufacturers.”110
Pryor continued, describing his ﬁndings from the Aging Committee hearings from 1989, and explaining
his change in focus from the drug costs of older Americans to the burden on State Medicaid budgets. His
legislative solution to the exploding Medicaid drug prices was entitled “Pharmaceuticals Access and Prudent
Purchasing Act of 1990” or PAPPA. PAPPA would give state governments express authority to negotiate
directly with drug companies to achieve lower Medicaid drug prices. Details would be forthcoming upon
the bill’s oﬃcial introduction.
While Pryor was sparing on the speciﬁcs of the legislation, he took care to spell out his concerns about the
legislative battle ahead and the formidable lobbying power of the drug industry. He warned:
“I understand that many Aging and Finance Committee members have heard from
drug manufacturers lobbying against this proposal even before the bill’s speciﬁca-
tions were written. In all the year I have been in the Senate, I have never seen
such an extensive lobbying campaign against an idea that has yet to be formally
introduced...I ask my colleagues one favor. Please read and evaluate my proposal
and not be misled by speculation about my intent or the industry’s dire predic-
tions...please remember who is not calling or writing to oppose it. It is not those
who have had to carry the burden of diﬃcult cost containment approaches aimed at
reducing skyrocketing State Medicaid prescription drug expenditures...Rather it is
the one participant of the Medicaid prescription drug program that has escaped all
cost containment initiatives—the prescription drug manufacturers.” 111
As promised, PAPPA was introduced formally two days later. PAPPA was virtually identical to “Option
282” from the majority staﬀ report released back in January. The skeleton had been ﬁlled in, but the basic
structure remained the same. Under PAPPA, the Department of Health and Human Services would establish
a National Pharmacy and Therapeutics Committee to evaluate the “relative safety and eﬃcacy, and the
comparability, of covered outpatient drugs approved for marketing in the United States.”112 Based upon
this information, the Committee would group the drugs into therapeutic classes, and determine which of the
drugs within any class had “superior safety and eﬃcacy.”113 Each state would then be required to solicit
bids directly from drug manufacturers for drugs in each federally-determined therapeutic class.114 The low
bid within a class would be considered the “preferred” drug and would be used almost exclusively in the
state’s Medicaid program.115 Medicaid programs would be entitled to a monthly rebate (per unit dispensed)
equal to the diﬀerence between the low-bid price and the average manufacturer price.
In other words, PAPPA mandated that each state establish a formulary that included one drug (the lowest
bid-price drug) in each therapeutic class. Pharmacists dispensing drugs other than the preferred drug
(i.e. dispensing “oﬀ-formulary drugs”) to Medicaid patients would not be reimbursed unless the prescribing
physician had explicitly indicated that the non-preferred drug was “medically necessary.” If a prescription
was for a non-preferred drug, but contained no written “medically necessary” restriction, the pharmacist
would be required to use “diligent eﬀorts” to contact the physician and receive permission to substitute the
preferred drug. If the pharmacist was unable to contact the prescribing physician, reimbursement for the
non-preferred drug would be limited to a 72-hour supply.
112Pharmaceuticals Access and Prudent Purchasing Act of 1990, S. 2605, 101st Cong. §1927(b)(3) (1990).
113Id.
114States were to create a group by January 1, 1993. States unable to implement such a program by that date would be
required participate in a Federal or multi-state buying group. Id.
115Note that the lowest bid need not necessarily be the basis for designating a drug as “preferred.” Rather, a drug may be
deemed preferred after “taking into account the total cost of medically necessary concomitant drug and or other therapy, the
length of time for which a price may be guaranteed, the likelihood of new drug approvals which may create opportunities for
lower negotiated prices in the drug use class, and such other business factors as the group or entity deems appropriate.” Id. at
§1927 (a)(9).
29To force drug manufacturers to play and enter “reasonable” rebate bids, S. 2605 required that the negotiated
rebate amount provide a “substantial price reduction.” State programs that did not achieve such a reduction
would be incorporated into the federal prescription drug negotiating group. The bill dictated that a state
would achieve a substantial price reduction when its payments for Medicaid prescription drugs (ingredient
costs only) were 85 percent or less than that year’s projected outlay for drugs based on 1990 expenditures.
The Special Committee on Aging staﬀ estimated that this bid/rebate plan would save states a combined
total of between $100 and $200 million annually.116
In introducing the legislation, Pryor paraded the support of fourteen organizations, including three pharma-
cist associations and eleven consumer groups. Still, the support did not detract from the Senator’s concerns
about the intensive pressure on lawmakers from the drug industry. Pryor continued his strike against “red
herring arguments the manufacturers have raised,” by distributing a question and answer sheet supplying
retorts to manufacturers’ arguments. 117
To the rest of the Senate, this was just another bill. With the typical lack of fanfare, PAPPA was referred to
the Committee on Finance. It had eight co-sponsors at the time of introduction.118 Nevertheless, PAPPA
had set oﬀ a ﬁrestorm in the drug industry. PMA President Mossinghoﬀ immediately denounced the bill as
“misguided” and based on a ﬂawed assumption of therapeutic interchangeability.119 Behind the scenes in
strategy sessions, PMA and member companies prepared their countermove.
Drug industry response to S. 2605
116The CBO would later project that S. 2605 would save taxpayers approximately $1.6 billion over 5 years. 136 Cong. Rec.
S. 12954 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1990)(statement of Sen. David Pryor).
117136 Cong. Rec. S5982-04 (daily ed. May 10, 1990)(statement of Sen. David Pryor).
118Senators Adams, Bumpers, Burdick, Conrad, Exon, Kerrey and Kohl joined Pryor in introducing the bill. 136 Cong. Rec.
S5982-02 (daily ed. May 10, 1990).
119Spencer Rich, Senator Seeks to Stem Rise in Medicaid Drug Costs, Wash. Post, May 10, 1990, at A13.
30PMA’s concerns with S. 2605 were easily anticipated based on its interactions with the Aging Committee
during the 1989 hearings. Knowing that legislation would be coming down in some way, shape, or form,
PMA corresponded heavily with Pryor and his staﬀ from the time of the second hearing in November. In
a white paper entitled, “Protecting Medicaid Patients from Restrictive Formularies,” PMA blasted “three
false assumptions” relied on by the majority staﬀ of the Aging Committee in arriving at their endorsement
of the one-drug formulary in PAPPA.120 The assumptions and their rebuttals were as follows:
♣
Assumption 1. There are no important diﬀerences among drugs in the same
therapeutic class.
♣ Retort: This assumption is false because there is no clinical consensus that any two drugs are thera-
peutically equivalent. Diﬀerent drugs have diﬀerent impacts on each individual.121
♣ Assumption 2. Restrictive formularies will save Medicaid money.
♣ Retort: Restrictive formularies cause Medicaid expenditures to rise, not fall. Because patients cannot
get appropriate drug therapies, states with restrictive formularies have higher physician and hospital expen-
ditures.
♣ Assumption 3: Lower pharmaceutical prices will not hurt innovation.
♣
Retort: Formularies undermine patent protection which is fundamental for ensuring
adequate proﬁts for innovation.122
120Aging Hearings, supra note 82, at 524 (PMA, Protecting Medicaid Patients from Restrictive Formularies, (January 19,
1990)).
121PMA would also later argue that the process for determining therapeutic substitutability in PAPPA was unconstitutional
because the National Pharmacy and Therapeutics Committee decisions were insulated from court or other administrative
review. See Hearing on Medicaid Prescription Drug Pricing Before the Sen. Comm. on Finance, 101st Cong. 152 (Sept. 17,
1990)[hereinafter Finance Hearing].
31When S. 2605 was introduced, PMA built on these arguments to mount its protest. To Pryor and his staﬀ,
PMA’s anti-formulary, anti-therapeutic equivalence arguments seemed motivated purely by the member
manufacturers’ desire to increase brand-name drug utilization and thereby increase proﬁts. Although proﬁt
motives were certainly a factor (if not the dominant one) behind this argument, PMA did have some grounds
for their assertions.
Leading scientists and physicians disagreed on the extent to which drugs within a therapeutic class were
interchangeable. The American Medical Association agreed with PMA that signiﬁcant diﬀerences between
drugs within a therapeutic class made the therapeutic interchange in PAPPA clinically dangerous. But most
HMOs and hospitals felt the clinical risks were minor—or at least minor enough to take—and employed
policies of drug substitution based on therapeutic equivalence. Little determinative research could be cited
by either side in support of their position. The prudence of therapeutic substitution remained a question
mark, thereby legitimizing PMA’s protest.
The wisdom of restrictive formularies as cost-cutting tools was likewise a matter of policy dispute. Then-
current research on the impact of formularies was inconclusive. Some studies supported Pryor’s conclusion
that formularies could cut costs signiﬁcantly. For example, in California, authorities estimated that their
formulary saved them approximately $400 million in Medicaid health expenditures per year.123 By contrast,
states like Louisiana found that imposing a restrictive formulary actually increased State Medicaid costs by
$27.1 million.124 A PMA-sponsored study that found that Medicaid expenditures in states with restrictive
formularies would be 4.1 to 30.5 percent higher than if the formulary had been open.125 In another study
looking speciﬁcally at the bid-formulary proposed by S. 2605, PMA determined that the lower prices obtained
through the bidding process would not reduce program savings. Compared with Senator Pryor’s estimate of
123Finance Hearing, supra note 121, at 67.
124See Id. at 69, 74 (testimony the Honorable Alphonese Jackson, Chairman, House Health and Welfare Committee, Louisiana
State Legislature, describing the Louisiana restrictive formulary).
125Id. at 164 (report from the California Department of Health Services, Open Drug Formularies: Myths and Misconceptions).
32$200 million a year, a PMA-funded study estimated cost savings of between $27 and $135 million in 1993.126
PMA’s argument that the lower prices would hurt innovation was less substantiated. Medicaid represented
only about 10 percent of the market. While the price cuts would hurt the bottom line, it would not
do so dramatically. Their claim was further weakened by a much-publicized Wall Street investment group
conclusion that “the Pryor bill is not a threat...even if passed, the impact of Pryor’s bill would be immaterial
for the industry.”127
Concentrating their message on the ﬁrst two arguments—the dangers of formularies and therapeutic substitution—
PMA began an intensive lobbying campaign against S. 2605.128 The day after the bill was introduced, PMA
printed anti-S. 2605 buttons to be distributed around the country.129 It took out a series of advertisements
in the Washington Post and Roll Call, a newspaper distributed widely on the Hill and in political circles
inside the Beltway. It organized meetings with members of Congress and with interest groups.
PMA focused its inter-organization lobbying on two primary types of interest groups: those who raised money
to support disease research, and those that represented minority interests. To the former group, PMA argued
that S. 2605 would thwart the disease research by taking money from R&D and impede doctors’ ability to
match patients with the best drug for them. In speaking with minority advocacy organizations, PMA
asserted that Pryor’s bill created a system of second-class medicine because drug choice was dictated by low-
bid rather than physicians’ medical judgments. Since a large percentage of Medicaid beneﬁciaries were people
of color, minorities would be disproportionately be the recipients of this second-class treatment. Medicaid
126PMA argued that these savings would be oﬀset by administrative costs, rendering the program budget neutral for Medicaid.
Paul E. Freiman, New Drug Legislation: A Response From the Pharmaceutical Industry, Health Affairs 112 (Fall 1990).
127136 Cong. Rec. S5982-04, S5986 (daily ed. May 10, 1990)(statement of Sen. David Pryor).
128Pryor would comment on the Senate ﬂoor in July that “when added to all the expensive PR, lobbying ﬁrms and lawyers
PMA and the drug manufacturers have hired, it is easy to understand why I sometimes feel they are spending more money
against my bill than the enactment of S. 2605 would actually cost them.” 136 Cong. Rec. S10497-04 (daily ed. July 25,
1990)(statement of Sen. David Pryor).
129Id.
33recipients could potentially receive their physician’s original drug selection, but the process for overriding
the formulary was cumbersome. PMA explained that the PAPPA call-back system would lead to “two lines
at the pharmacist’s counter: one where prescriptions would be ﬁlled promptly and a second Medicaid line of
persons waiting for the pharmacists to...reach the physician to get permission to substitute a low-bid drug
for the one originally prescribed.”130 This message aﬀected minority organizations. Groups including the
National Black Caucus of State Legislators and the National Black Nurses’ Association became the ﬁrst to
write letters to Pryor, admonishing him for further impeding access to medical care for the poorest of the
poor.
OMB’s June 20 proposal
As the summer began, it became clearer that the support for changes to Medicaid drug prices extended
beyond Pryor and his liberal cronies on the Hill. On June 20, President George H.W. Bush and his White
House staﬀ put forth a new proposal to shrink the budget deﬁcit by about $50.5 billion.131 Included in these
cuts was a provision requiring drug companies cut the prices charged to Medicaid.
The plan, developed by the Executive Branch’s Oﬃce of Management and Budget (OMB), was nearly iden-
tical to PAPPA, but with one notable diﬀerence. The therapeutic substitution in the OMB plan was more
stringent than that oﬀered in S. 2605. For example, if a physician prescribed a non-formulary drug and did
not indicate “brand medically necessary,” PAPPA would require that the pharmacist attempt to contact
the physician prior to substituting the low-bid, formulary drug. This plan based on therapeutic equivalence
properly was called “therapeutic interchange.” By contrast, under the OMB proposal, pharmacists would
130Finance Hearing, supra note 121, at 139 (prepared statement of Gerald J. Mossinghoﬀ).
131Jeﬀrey H. Birnbaum and David Wessel, White House Puts Forward Budget Proposal, Wall St. J., June 21, 1990, at A2.
34be allowed to substitute the therapeutically equivalent drug without contacting the patient’s physician. This
plan was known as “therapeutic substitution.”
Despite the signiﬁcant diﬀerence between therapeutic substitution and therapeutic interchange, the OMB
proposal and Pryor’s S. 2605 were immediately equated in the minds of the public and those on Capitol Hill.
PMA’s eﬀorts to enlist support of disease research and minority groups against Pryor’s bill took oﬀ. On July
9, PMA sent a letter of protest to budget summit negotiators signed by fourteen of these organizations. The
letter was also published in a full page advertisement in the Washington Post.132 The next day, PMA held a
press conference where representatives of the National Black Caucus of State Legislators, the National Black
Nurses Association, and the League of United Latin American Citizens decried the proposals.133 To shore
up its Capitol Hill presence, PMA hired Vernon Jordan, famed civil rights leader, to lobby against S. 2605
on these grounds.
PMA would later deny that it intentionally conﬂated the two proposals or ever characterized Pryor’s bill as
a plan for therapeutic substitution.134 Yet PMA had not taken great pains to highlight the distinction. The
group published a three-volume book of letters, entitled “Leading Organizations Speak Out in Opposition to
Restricted Drug List/Therapeutic Substitution,” and distributed it to members of the Senate Finance and
the Energy and Commerce Committees. The ﬁrst volume of the publication contained 62 letters and was or-
ganized alphabetically within categories based on writer characteristics (Organization, Member of Congress,
Organizations of State Legislators, or State Legislators).135 As such, there was no physical distinction be-
tween the letters of groups that opposed the restricted drug list of Pryor’s S. 2605 and those that opposed
therapeutic substitution in the OMB plan. The Table of Contents of the book listed several organizations
132The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, Toward Open Access: Letters and Statements from the 1990
Debate on Medicaid Prescription Drug Restrictions xii, (1990).
133Julie Kosterlitz, Washington Update: Drugmakers’ Odd Allies, Ntnl. J., July 14, 1990.
134Finance Hearing, supra note 121, at 46.
135A second and third volume were later circulated. In total, opposition letters numbered around 156. Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association, supra note 132.
35that had not taken a position on the proposed legislation, but only on the policy of therapeutic substitution.
Although the book technically did not misrepresent the Pryor bill, the confusion produced by the tactic can-
not be understated. Even Representative Ron Wyden, co-sponsor of the ﬁnal rebate language in the House,
would be tricked into equating the OMB and S. 2605. In commenting on an alternative rebate proposal, Mr.
Wyden would state that the new legislation “makes a number of changes from the original version of the
Pryor bill, S. 2605. [First] there is no therapeutic substitution, so a doctor can control the medicine that
the consumer will get.”136 If a man so deeply involved in the rebate discussion could make this error, it is
abundantly clear the public would too.
Even if Pryor’s bill was equated with the OMB proposal, it is somewhat incredible that the criticism of
therapeutic substitution as “second class medicine” carried as much weight as it did. Ironically, by requiring
therapeutic substitution, Medicaid was adopting a process employed by the top health insurers. Medicaid
was not going second-class; it was adopting a ﬁrst-class best-practice in drug cost containment. The majority
(64%) of the largest health maintenance organizations’ prescription drug plans employed a system based on
therapeutic substitution in 1990. As a result, a total of 20 million Americans had health insurance with
restricted outpatient formularies.137 Moreover, in the inpatient setting, 58 percent of hospitals reported
having a “well controlled (closed) formulary with almost no duplication of generic equivalents and minimal
duplication of therapeutically equivalent drug products.”138
Despite the reality of the situation, Pryor’s S. 2605 was getting a bad reputation as a prescription for second-
class treatment of the poor. Although the White House was excited about drug rebates, legislative action
would be tougher going if unsupported by traditional allies in the ﬁght for lower drug prices.
136Finance Hearing, supra note 121, at 10.




PMA members were comforted by the traction they were getting with minority groups, but only slightly.
To be sure, the support of the White House made federal action more likely. In July, the National Journal
observed, “To the industry’s dismay, White House interest appears to have made a formerly obscure proposal
into a serious contender.”139 Fearing the worst, individual pharmaceutical companies attempted to preempt
such legislation, or at the very least, get a more palatable version of a federal rebate program on the table.
Several drug companies, including Merck, Sharp & Dohme, Pﬁzer Inc., The Upjohn Company, and Glaxo,
Inc., brought their own rebate proposals directly to the states. Many states were eager to accept the olive
branch.
Merck, in fact, had developed its rebate proposal before the introduction of S. 2605. 140 The program,
entitled “Equal Access to Medicines and Best Price Discounts Act,” oﬀered State Medicaid programs “best
price”-based rebates for Merck’s single-source drugs. That is, the rebate would equal the diﬀerence between
average wholesale price and the best-price oﬀered to any other purchaser. The minimum rebate under the
plan would be 10 percent. To start, Merck would impose a ceiling on the rebate amount equal to 15 percent
of drug costs; by the end of ﬁve years there would be no limit on rebates that could be returned to states.141
Of course, the deal was not without a hitch. In return for the rebate, states were required to reimburse all
Merck single-source products without formularies, prior authorization requirements, or other restrictions.142
The Merck plan oﬃcially began on July 1. By the end of August, over half of State Medicaid programs
had accepted Merck’s terms and others were simply hammering out the details of their participation.143
139Kosterlitz, supra note 133.
140Spencer Rich, Firm Oﬀers Discounts to Medicaid Plans, Wash. Post, Apr. 21, 1990, at A05. Merck’s motivation for
proposing their rebate program many months before other manufacturers is unclear. There has been some suggestion that
Merck oﬀered this plan only because it oﬀered low discounts relative to other drug manufacturers. See e.g., Michael R. Pollard
and John M. Coster, UpDate: Savings for Medicaid Drug Spending, Health Aff., 197, 205 (Summer 1991).
141Finance Hearing, supra note 121, at 39.
142Michael F. Conlan, Merck Oﬀers Price Cuts to Medicaid—With Strings, Drug Topics, May 21, 1990, at 42.
143By the September Subcommittee hearings, 32 states had adopted the Merck proposal and another ten were near acceptance.
37The cost savings from the Merck plan were noteworthy, but not mind blowing. For example, in Georgia,
researchers were projecting cost savings to amount to only 0.25% to 0.4% of the state’s annual Medicaid
drug expenditures.144 Projected across all 50 states, Merck predicted cost savings of over $20 million per
year.145
Other drug manufacturers were more hesitant to volunteer rebate programs.146 Come August, however, with
OMB pressing its proposal and Congressional observers predicting action on Pryor’s bill, more companies
threw their hats into the ring.147 Pﬁzer, Glaxo and Upjohn were among those that oﬀered their variations
on a Medicaid rebate plan.148
Pﬁzer’s plan was closest to Merck’s, likewise oﬀering rebates based on “best market price” of their single-
source drugs. 149 Also similar was the requirement that participating states do away with prior authorization.
Unlike the Merck ﬁve-year phase in, which capped percentage rebate per drug product, Pﬁzer oﬀered three
years for ramping up. States would receive only 1/3 of the rebate payments authorized under the plan
during the ﬁrst year and 2/3 in the second. The full amount would be realized in year three. To leave no
question as to the motivation behind the plan, Pﬁzer stated outright that the program was predicated on
the requirement that the federal government would not implement a federal Medicaid formulary.
The Glaxo proposal diﬀered slightly in its approach toward calculating Medicaid rebates, basing rebates not
on “best price” but rather on the best price in the managed care market.150 The Glaxo “managed care”
Martha Glaser, et al., Majority of States Give Nod to Merck Discount Plan, Drug Topics, Aug. 20, 1990, at 63; see also
Finance Hearing, supra note 121, at 39.
144Glaser, supra note 143.
145Linda Darnell, More Firms Give Medicaid Breaks on Drug Prices, L.A. Times, Sept 17, 1990, at 1.
146Beginning in July, two other “major drug companies” had been speaking with Pryor about potential rebate alternatives.
These plans were not formally introduced to the states until the end of August. 136 Cong. Rec. S10497, 10499 (daily ed. July
25, 1990)(statement of Sen. David Pryor).
147Timothy Noah, Drug Concerns Seek to Block Medicaid Curbs, Wall St J., Aug. 8, 1990, at B1.
148Several smaller drug companies, including G.D. Searle & Co. also had begun to develop their own rebate program. PMA
reported on September 17, that more than a dozen PMA companies, or over one-half of the Medicaid single-source drug market,
were negotiating discounts and rebates with Medicaid oﬃcials. Finance Hearing, supra note 121, at 40. Forty-two states were
rumored to be involved in these negotiations. Id.
149Finance Hearing, supra note 121, at 38-40.
150Id.
38model was further limited to independent practice association (IPA) purchasers rather than a group model
HMO. Therefore, these rebate amounts were likely to be smaller than those in the Merck and Pﬁzer plans.
States participating in the Glaxo plan could not exclude their single-source drugs from Medicaid formularies.
Finally, the Upjohn model oﬀered a rebate plan entirely diﬀerent from the rest. Upjohn proposed a rebate
on single source drugs of three percent of prescription cost, plus 75 cents for claims processing.151 The
manufacturer estimated this would result in average rebates of $1 to $2.48. Upjohn asserted that this
model’s administrative simplicity and easy calculations rendered it superior to the plan’s oﬀered by its sister
manufacturers.
Despite the states’ eager acceptance of the rebate proposals, Pryor felt the manufacturers’ models would not
achieve satisfactory cost savings and were susceptible to manipulations. He observed: “Any program that
gives the drug manufacturers free reign to reduce or eliminate the discounts or manipulate their ‘best prices’
cannot be counted on to achieve signiﬁcant savings for the multi-billion dollar Medicaid drug program.”152
Because, in the case of the Merck and Pﬁzer plan, the companies would have control over their best price,
they could eliminate discounts over time while still managing to secure listing on the Medicaid formulary.
The Glaxo plan was equally objectionable as, “in the scheme of things, these HMOs receive only very small
discounts as compared to discounts oﬀered by manufacturers to other purchasers.”153 Pryor held the Upjohn
plan in the lowest regard, calling it a “poorly thought out and totally unacceptable plan.”154 Moreover, the
plans applied only to single-source innovator drugs while data showed much of the costs were driven by
high-priced multiple-source non-innovators.155
151Id.
152Id. at 214 (Senate Aging Committee Staff, Analysis of Drug Manufacturer Medicaid Drug Discount Proposals and
Necessary Elements of Medicaid Drug Price Negotiation Plan (Sept. 1990)).
153Id.
154Id.
155PMA studies projected that Medicaid drug expenditures in 1991 would be divided: $1.5 billion on single source drugs, $1.6
billion on retail/wholesale markups and dispensing fees; and $1.9 million on multiple-source drugs (including multiple source
innovator drugs and generics). Id. at 143.
39Analysts too were skeptical about the impact of the drug rebate proposals. Economists predicted the
discounts would have little direct cost for manufacturers and may in fact expand their Medicaid market.
As many states had already implemented restrictive formularies, many felt drug manufacturers were simply
using their discounts to entice states to reopen their program to manufacturer’s products.156 Still, others on
Wall Street feared that by oﬀering a rebate oﬀ of AWP, manufacturers were opening the door to additional
criticism of their drug pricing policies. One analyst observed that because “the issue has unearthed a whole
question about how drugs are priced,” the rebate plans may just increase pressure to discount for other
purchasers, such as HMOs and private insurers.157 Ultimately, the long-term impact of the pharmaceutical-
oﬀered plans would never be known. Although PMA President Mossinghoﬀ contended that the discount
programs made “further federal action...unwarranted,” Senator Pryor disagreed and kept the issue alive on
Capitol Hill. 158
Another federal option: S. 3029
As the conversation progressed between the drug companies and the states, Senator Pryor did not wish to
be left out of the loop. The Senator felt strongly that any state plan would fall short of a federal solution, at
least insofar as guaranteeing that the negotiated prices be locked in for some period of time. Pryor needed
to refocus the debate on the federal level before the drug company plans diﬀused the issue’s ﬁrepower. His
staﬀ began busily drafting a new piece of Medicaid rebate legislation. PAPPA had been hit hard by the
consumer groups as a racially discriminatory system of second class medicine. These were organizations the
156For example, if Alabama were to accept either the Merck or Upjohn proposals, the State Medicaid program would have
been required to add more expensive drugs to its formulary. On balance, the state decided this increased cost would not be
oﬀset by the rebate amount and rejected the two plans. Tim Brightbill, Bills Push Medicaid Drug Discount, HealthWeek,
Sept. 17, 1990, at 9.
157Linda Darnell Williams, More Firms Give Medicaid Breaks on Drug Prices, L.A. Times, Sept. 17, 1990, at D1.
158Brightbill, supra note 156.
40Senator needed on his side. Pryor needed a fresh, new approach that could not be maligned on the issue of
therapeutic substitution.
The new bill was S. 3029, the Medicaid Anti-Discriminatory Drug Price and Patient Beneﬁt Restoration
Act of 1990.159 S.3029 was oﬃcially introduced on September 12. Pryor insisted that S. 3029 was “not a
substitute for nor an amended version of S. 2605” but rather “one other option that can be considered.”160
Nevertheless, S.3029 quickly became the focal point of the debate. By addressing some of the criticisms that
had been leveled against S. 2605, S. 3029 seemed to move the sides a bit closer together.
The Medicaid Anti-Discriminatory Drug Price and Patient Beneﬁt Restoration Act required that drug man-
ufacturers provide Medicaid the best price it oﬀered to any other purchaser in order to be covered by a State
Medicaid program. These discounts would apply to both single source and innovator multiple source drug
products. For non-innovator multiple source drugs, manufacturers would be required to provide a ﬂat rebate
of 10 percent of the aggregate expenditures for those drug products. The contract for the rebate program
would be negotiated between the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the individual manufacturers.
In practice, State Medicaid programs would pay pharmacists the average manufacturer price (AMP) for each
unit of a drug sold. Then, on a quarterly basis, drug manufacturers would be required to reimburse State
Medicaid programs a per unit dollar amount equal to the diﬀerence between the best price the manufacturer
oﬀered to any other purchaser and AMP. To prevent manufacturers from hiking their best price to reduce
the rebate amount, S. 3029 would require drug manufacturers’ best price be no greater than the best price
in place on September 1, 1990, indexed to the consumer price index. In an attempt to allay the concerns
of manufacturers who had steep (e.g., over 60 percent) discounts as of September 1, the bill would cap the
rebate amount at 25 percent of the state expenditures attributable to that drug. Rebates could be no less
than the 10 percent required of generic drugs.
159Medicaid Anti-Discriminatory Drug Price and Patient Beneﬁt Restoration Act, S. 3029, 101st Cong. §1927 (1990).
160136 Cong. Rec. S12954-01 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1990)(statement of Sen. Pryor).
41States receiving rebates were required to reimburse for all rebate-covered drugs. However, states could use a
prior authorization system so long as that system was available to physicians 24 hours a day, 7 days a week
and provided an immediate response to the authorization request.
Pryor 1 versus Pryor 2: A comparison of S. 3029 and S. 2605
S. 3029 appeared to address concerns surrounding therapeutic interchangeability that had allowed PMA to
unite many consumer groups against S. 2605. Medicaid-covered drugs under S. 3029 would not be chosen
simply based on a low-bid within a given therapeutic class. Rather, S. 3029 allowed a state to reimburse
for any drug which had negotiated a rebate plan. Therefore, on its face, S. 3029 presented a less restrictive
formulary than S. 2605. Still, the fact that states could reimburse for any rebate drug did not mean that
they were required to do so. States were still free to subject rebate-covered drugs to a prior-approval
system. As such, drug manufacturers were not assured that Medicaid enrollees would have freewheeling
access to their drugs even if they oﬀered a rebate. This contrasted signiﬁcantly with the agreements that
drug manufacturers had been securing with individual states, which guaranteed that rebate-covered drugs
would be part of the State Medicaid formulary. This “improvement” in S. 3029 therefore would only slightly
detract from concerns about formularies and prior approval.
The diﬀerence in formulary structure also created a diﬀerence in the rebate calculation. While S. 2605
anchored the rebate amount to the bid price of the manufacturer, S. 3029 introduced a new reference point:
the “best price.” Of course, this term was not in fact new but lifted directly out of the plans proposed by
the drug manufacturers themselves. Both Merck and Pﬁzer had based their discounts to the states on their
best price oﬀered to any other purchaser. Pryor thus was able to state that “this legislation simply builds
42on the proposals already put forth by the drug industry.”161
Most people knew that companies like Merck and Pﬁzer were able to oﬀer a best price term because they did
not in fact have very steep discounts in any of their markets. In short, their best price was not so good.162 By
contrast other companies with steep VA discounts, such as Upjohn, disliked the best price anchor. Therefore,
the move to a best price metric worked mixed results on the pharmaceutical manufacturers. Knowing the
varied acceptance of the best price idea throughout the industry, Pryor nevertheless attached to the concept.
In fact, by splitting the industry in this way, Pryor weakened the resolve of his biggest opponent. Certain
ﬁrms were just not going to push as hard against the legislation. Moreover, because the best price idea was
scored to provide more savings than S. 2605 ($1.3 billion versus $2.5 billion over ﬁve years for S. 3029) Pryor
was able to onboard Senators attracted to the rebate legislation solely for its budget hook.
A ﬁnal signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the two Pryor bills was the locus of negotiating power. S. 3029 explicitly
shifted the negotiation power from the various states to the federal government. Although S. 2605 did call
for HHS to form a purchasing group for prescription drugs, such an option was only a back up if the states
could not take the initiative on its own. It was the hammer for drug companies who would not undertake
real negotiation with the states. By contrast, the contract in S. 3029 would be established on the federal
level.
In praise of the free market: September hearings, panels 1 & 2
Even before the introduction of S. 3029, plans had been made to continue the Senate debate on “modifying
Medicaid’s drug reimbursement program.”163 On August 17, the Senate Finance Subcommittee on Health
161Id.
162See Pollard and Coster, supra note 140.
163Finance Hearing, supra note 121, at 1.
43for Families and the Uninsured announced plans to hold a September 17 hearing. The new Pryor approach—
introduced just ﬁve days before the hearing—would be an integral part of the discussion.
The Finance Subcommittee hearing was the ﬁrst Senate examination of Medicaid drug pricing to occur
outside of the Aging Committee. Senator Pryor did not sit on the Subcommittee, but attended as a Member
of the full Committee. Control of the hearing was in the hands of Subcommittee Chairman Donald W.
Riegle (D-Mich.)—at least to start.
A whopping fourteen witnesses were scheduled to appear. Gerald Mossinghoﬀ of PMA would be in the
middle of the pack, accompanied by representatives from member manufacturers Merck, Pﬁzer, Glaxo, and
Upjohn—the four major pharmaceutical ﬁrms that had proposed their own state-level rebate programs. But
on September 17, it was friendly ﬁre of fellow Democratic Senator Bill Bradley who began the attack of
S. 3029. Bradley was from New Jersey, home to several large pharmaceutical companies that had been
pressuring him on the Pryor bill. In his opening statement, Bradley aligned with his constituents. S. 3029,
he said, looked like a dangerously “rigid system of price controls.”164
This characterization of S. 3029 would stick. It would be leveled as a criticism of S. 3029 throughout the
hearing—by HCFA Administrator Gail Wilensky (“My concern about the explicit way of ensuring that you
keep the best price over time is that it sounds an awful lot like a price control to me...because it pegs a price
at a given point in time.”)165; by the Director of the Pharmaceutical Economics Research Center at Purdue
University, Mr. Stephen Schondelmeyer (“I do not feel that it is in the best interest to index the best price
over time.”)166, and by PMA President Mossinghoﬀ (“[The] idea of price controls is inimical to this country’s
free market economy...A quintessential feature of world-wide developments is that free-market forces serve





44Mossinghoﬀ, these witnesses were generally receptive to Pryor’s proposal and saw possible remedies to the
price-indexing prescribed by S. 3029.168
By contrast, the price control element was not the only one that continued to disturb PMA. Mr. Mossinghoﬀ
expressed concern that the attempt to improve the single-drug formulary oﬀered by S. 2605 was unsatisfactory
because it continued to allow individual states to implement a prior-approval system, which he saw as
amounting to a de facto restrictive formulary. He also submitted that S. 3029 was “inherently unfair” for
two reasons. The ﬁrst inequity was that it had a greater negative economic impact on companies oﬀering steep
discounts than those with less “friendly” discount policies. The second was that the proposal required higher
rebates of drugs no longer under patent (innovator multiple source drugs) than their generic competition. S.
3029 was not going to make the research-based pharmaceutical companies happy. Mr. Mossinghoﬀ instead
continued to advocate for the individual company plans in lieu of federal action.
After only one question of his constituent-company Upjohn, Senator Riegle excused himself from the hearing
and invited Senator Pryor (who had “graciously agreed to chair the rest of this hearing”) to assume the
chair position.169 The show was again largely Pryor’s aﬀair to run. He got oﬀ to a galloping start. “Mr.
Mossinghoﬀ, you talk about a free market economy,” he began. “Well, what the free market economy has
brought to us is that chart, the highest priced drugs anywhere today are paid for by those least able to aﬀord
them. That is what the free market economy you speak of has brought us. We cannot stand it. It does not
make sense. It is unjustiﬁed.”170
Despite the permeating animosity reﬂected in this opening comment, the conversation on S. 3029 was in
fact somewhat more productive. By assuming the best price construct as a baseline, the drug manufacturers
168For example, HCFA suggested taking an index of the manufacturer’s sole source drug prices over time, with additional
rebates required only if the index goes above CPI or MCPI increases. Mr. Schondelmeyer recommended the bill “index the
average manufacturer’s price at a certain point in time and then require that the price that be given to the Medicaid program
be the lower of the best price or that indexed manufacturer’s price minus 10 percent or the current manufacturer’s price minus
10 percent.” Finance Hearing, supra note 121 at 29, 36.
169Id. at 42.
170Id. at 42.
45and Pryor were closer to operating on the same page. The sides began to debate the principle of the best
price reference point on its economic merits. Both agreed that the Veteran’s Administration price would in
most cases be the best price for any given drug. But was using this price, the price oﬀered to only 1 percent
of the market, an appropriate “barometer” for a fair market price? What would happen if the best price
accounted for drug prices in Europe? In sum, while no problems were solved in this segment of the hearing,
the conversation had been elevated, if only slightly, from the name calling and ﬁnger pointing of earlier days.
Consumer groups, states highly divided: September hearings, panels 3 & 4
Senator Pryor’s day of defending his rebate proposals did not end after PMA and manufacturers took their
seats among the public. Next to testify were three consumer groups. Their feelings on the new Pryor
bill were generally positive. In fact, Families USA was eﬀusive, urging adoption of the “rare opportunity
to achieve savings and improve quality of care in the Medicaid program.”171 By contrast, the American
Medical Association and the Epilepsy Foundation of America were more cautious in their praise.172 These
organizations had been among those who had allied with PMA against therapeutic substitution. S. 3029
provided some comfort that therapeutic substitution was oﬀ the table for the moment. Still, patient access
remained of concern. The prior authorization system did not adequately provide for a timely appeal or a
rational process for determining whether authorization would be given to cover the requested drug.
The state reaction to the various legislative proposals concluded the hearing. Even more than the consumer
groups, the states reacted in diﬀerent ways to the Pryor proposals. California supported national action




46Louisiana would only support legislation that would not require a restrictive formulary of any sort.174 A
legislative proposal could allow the preferred approach of both states if it left the door open for states to
have restrictive formularies without requiring them. Sanctioning restrictive formularies or prior authorization
would buy Pryor a host of enemies in PMA and consumer groups. Without either tactic, however, much of
the cost savings might not be realized.
Counting the votes: Toward OBRA 1990
The ideas vocalized in the September hearing had hardly been digested before the larger legislative current
of 1990 grabbed hold of the rebate bill’s fate. Congress was in the throes of a debate on a deﬁcit-reducing
budget package. The discussion had been initiated in April, and it had been determined that the process of
reconciliation would be used.
Budget reconciliation is a creature unto itself. It begins with the passage of a budget resolution, which estab-
lishes budget targets in each major expenditure category. Committees with jurisdiction over the spending
programs are then required to work within the budget constraint to determine program spending, devising
budget-cutting or revenue-generating measures as needed to meet the target. When the combined reports
from all committees are melded into an omnibus bill, no substantive changes are generally permitted. The
full omnibus measure is submitted to the ﬂoor for passage with limited time for debate.175 With so much
wrapped up in the package, reconciliation measures generally pass without a hitch.
Some have described the reconciliation process as an “express train” that allows the party in control of the
174Id. at 69-71.
175In the Senate, ﬂoor debate is limited to twenty hours. In the House, the rules committee establishes the extent to which
debate can be heard and amendments can be proposed.
47Congress to “promote the adoption of measures that members managed to pack into it, which were less likely
to be authorized if considered alone.”176 With the Democrats ﬁrmly in charge in 1990, they were able to do
just that. For Pryor, this meant it would be far easier to make some version of the rebate plan into law.
To devise a budget plan acceptable to the House, Senate and White House, representatives of each body had
been working vigorously throughout the summer of 1990. It was at this summit that the OMB proposal was
ﬁrst released, so a drug rebate plan was clearly on the table. The question had always been what version
would emerge from these conversations. Finally on September 30 a budget deal was reached. The rebate
provisions of the agreement were drawn largely from S. 3029, basing the rebate on the best price metric and
setting a ﬂoor and ceiling for rebate amounts.
Inclusion in the budget negotiators’ plan did not seal the deal for the rebate program, of course. In fact,
the budget summit agreement failed, with the House rejecting it on October 5. The two chambers now had
more ﬂexibility to pass their own budget bills. Then it would again take more work to reconcile the two.
The House passed their reconciliation bill ﬁrst on October 16.177 Under the leadership of Representatives
Ron Wyden and Jim Cooper, the House version not only incorporated rebates but was tougher on the
drug companies than the Senate-approved plan.178 The House plan was based on a best-price scheme with
“best price” deﬁned as the lowest price oﬀered to any purchaser or the best price oﬀered to these entities
on September 1, 1990 increased by the percentage increase in CPI-U between 1990 and the rebate period
in question. Rebates would be capped at 25 percent AMP in 1991 and 1992 and 50 percent in 1993 and
1994. Signiﬁcantly, the bill explicitly allowed formularies, providing that states could restrict the “amount,
duration, and scope of coverage” of any rebate-covered prescription drug. The House version was projected
176Gilman, supra note 98, at 122.
177Final Vote Results for Roll Call 475, Vote on Passage of H.R. 5835, Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, (Oct. 16,
1990), available at http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1990/roll475.xml.
178Timothy Noah, Medicaid Would Receive Drug Discounts Under House, Senate Budget Packages, Wall St. J., Oct. 19,
1990, at A16.
48to save $2.1 billion over ﬁve years.179 With only three hours of general debate allowed for the full omnibus
measure, the topic of drug rebates was never raised. The House’s budget reconciliation bill, H.R. 5835,
passed by a vote of 227 – 203.180
For all his toil, Pryor saw a more lenient version of the rebate plan come out of the Senate than that oﬀered
in the House. While the details of the Finance Committee negotiation are unclear, the measure seems to
have been worked out primarily among ﬁve major players: Senators Bentsen, Packwood, Riegle, Hatch
and Pryor.181 The plan required drug companies to provide a ﬁxed 15 percent rebate on single-source and
multiple-source innovator during the ﬁrst three years. Only after this time would the best price mechanism
come into play, with manufacturers required to rebate 15 percent or the diﬀerence between AMP and best
price, whichever was larger. Interestingly, the “best price” deﬁnition was exclusive of the price of drugs sold
to Veterans Aﬀairs depots.182 Although Pryor had gravitated to the VA price as a comparable throughout
the prior year, the Senate version abandoned the notion of matching Medicaid prices with VA prices. The bill
did attempt to prevent drug manufacturers from raising their prices in response to the best price provision
(Pryor’s primary concern with the individual drug company plans) by directing the Secretary of HHS to
establish a method of adjusting the basic rebate “to ensure that a manufacturer’s price for such drugs...do
not increase by percentage that is greater than the increase in the Consumer Price Index for all urban
consumers from October 1, 1990 to the month before the beginning of the calendar quarter (or other period)
involved.”183
179Id.
180Final Vote, supra note 177.
181See 136 Cong. Rec. S15777, 15858 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 199)(statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).
182VA medical centers got their drugs through various sources. Approximately 35-45 percent of VA drugs in 1990 were
purchased from VA depots. The prices received by federal depots were explicitly excluded from the Medicaid best price
deﬁnition. However, VA medical centers also obtained drugs based on catalog prices in the Federal Supply Schedule and from
direct negotiation with drug manufacturers. These prices were to be taken into account when determining best price. Thus,
to say that OBRA did not require matching of Medicaid and VA prices is not entirely accurate. Still, the least expensive VA
drug prices—those referred to by Pryor throughout the hearings—had always been the federal depot prices. See Hearings on
H.R. 2890—To Establish Limits on Prices of Drugs Procured by the Dep’t of Veterans’ Aﬀ. Before the Subcomm. On Hosp.
and Health Care of the House Comm. on Veterans’ Aﬀ., 102nd Cong. 12 (1991) (statement of Anthony J. Principi, Deputy
Secretary, Department of Veterans Aﬀairs)[hereinafter Veterans’ Aﬀairs Hearing].
183136 Cong. Rec. S15777-02, 18586 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1990).
49Also unlike the House version, the Senate plan would forbid formularies that did not permit coverage of all
drugs for which a rebate existed. Prior authorization was allowed (if operated in accordance with the same
terms found in Pryor’s second bill), but a state could not subject a new drug to prior authorization during
its ﬁrst year on the market. The cost savings of the Senate plan were scored at $1.8 billion over ﬁve years.184
Senator Orrin Hatch explained that the Senate version was “not precisely what Senator Pryor would like, it
is not all that patients would like, it is certainly not what the research-based pharmaceutical industry would
like—but it is, as it stands, something that most of us can and should support...In short...the legislation
would achieve a delicate balance between cutting program costs, improving the access of Medicaid patients to
needed medicines, and preserving the incentives necessary to encourage continued pharmaceutical research
and development.”185 The Senate reconciliation bill was passed on October 18 by a vote of 54-46.186
The conference on the reconciliation bill began on October 19. The negotiations between the conferees from
the Senate Finance and House Energy and Commerce Committees were kept largely under wraps.187 The
high-proﬁle nature of the rebate element made discussions easier behind closed doors. On October 31, the
House and Senate had worked out their diﬀerences and were able to send the measure to the White House.188
The bill was signed into law on November 5.
As passed, the drug rebate elements of OBRA reﬂected a compromise between the House and Senate recon-
ciliation proposals. To the pleasure of the drug manufacturers, formulary restrictions in the House version
were out; to their chagrin, prior authorization was still in.189 As far as the rebate amount was concerned, the
184Noah, supra note 178.
185136 Cong. Rec. S15777, 15858 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1990)(statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).
186Id. at S18567-8.
187Julie Rovner, Conferees Take $43 Billion from Medicare Programs, Cong. Q. Wkly, October 27, 1990.
188Id.
189No prior authorization could be required for newly approved drugs during their ﬁrst six months on the market. OBRA
1990, supra note 1.
50Senate “best of percentage or best-price” option was adopted. For 1991 and 1992, drug prices after rebate
would be 87.5 percent of AMP or best price, with maximum rebates of 25 percent in the ﬁrst year and 50
percent in the second. Beginning in 1993, the drug price after rebate would be 85 percent AMP or best
price. The bill would account for inﬂation, but without the harsh indexing in S. 3029 or the House-proposed
version of the reconciliation. Instead, OBRA oﬀered a formula for calculating additional rebates for single
source and innovator multiple source drugs.190 The ﬁnal version of the rebate program was to save the
federal government $1.9 billion and the states’ Medicaid programs $1.4 billion across the ﬁrst ﬁve years.191
The Aftermath
Heated discussion of Medicaid drug rebates did not end when OBRA was signed by the President. The law
was to be implemented on January 1, 1991. Drug companies would be required to sign rebate agreements
with HHS by March 1, or, starting in April, federal matching funds for their products would not be avail-
able.192 OBRA grandfathered in previously negotiated state rebate agreements if they were as favorable
as the statutory rebate requirements, but the old deals generally were not. Manufacturers opted to forego
renegotiating these individual rebate deals in favor of signing on to a national rebate agreement.
PMA and its members did have other work to do in the states, however. The group began to canvass the
190(i) For calendar quarters (or other periods) beginning after December 31, 1990 and ending before January 1, 1994—
(I) the total number of each dosage form and strength of a single source or innovator multiple source drug dispensed during
the calendar quarter (or other period); multiplied by
(II) (aa) the average manufacturer price for each dosage form and strength, minus
(bb) the average manufacturer price for each such dosage form and strength in eﬀect on October 1, 1990, increased by the
percentage increase in the Consumer Price Index for all urban consumers (U.S. average) from October 1, 1990, to the month
before the beginning of the calendar quarter (or other period) involved.
For periods beginning after December 31, 1993 the calculation was identical except that instead of accounting for inﬂation
on a drug-speciﬁc basis, the equation would account for inﬂation based on the price increases of a market-basket of a speciﬁc
manufacturer’s single source and innovator multiple source drugs. OBRA 1990, supra note 1. In 1993, the law would be
amended to preserve the original drug-by-drug calculation. OBRA 1993, supra note 28.
191Karen Southwick, Medicaid Drug Rebate Gets Flak from Two Sides, Health Week, Nov. 12, 1990, at 13. PMA estimated
the cost to the industry to be closer to $3.4 billion over ﬁve years. Despite Problems, US Pharmaceutical Industry Is in Good
Shape, Financial Times, Mar. 1, 1991.
192Those who failed to comply by that date would be excluded from Medicaid participation for three months (i.e., until the
next rebate period). See Pollard and Coster, supra note 140, at 198.
51country working to convince State Medicaid administrators of the costliness and dangers of prior-approval
programs.193 On this issue, PMA received some degree of support from the government: the Department
of Health and Human Services warned states against using prior authorization heavy-handedly such that it
“unfairly den[ies] access to medically necessary drugs.”194
As PMA shifted it’s lobbying to the developing state-by-state regulatory structure, Pryor and others in the
Congress eagerly awaited the results of the ﬁrst round of rebate negotiations. Unfortunately, legislators
quickly learned that the rebate amounts did not seem as favorable as expected. Manufacturers’ reported
best prices, the foundations of the rebate calculation, had increased.195 Not only were Medicaid savings
smaller, but other purchasers, notably the VA, were facing higher prices.196 Numbers were not yet available
to substantiate these claims, but anecdotal evidence indicated that the increase in cost to other purchasers
far oﬀset the Medicaid savings.
In January, Senator Pryor expressed his concerns in a letter to HCFA Administrator Gail Wilensky:
“...I am seriously disturbed by the wholesale changes that appear to be
occurring in the market in an attempt to circumvent the Medicaid law...I
strongly believe that such ﬁnancial ‘arrangements’ made by the drug man-
ufacturers must be taken into consideration for the purposes of determining
the Medicaid discount.”197
193Gerald J. Mossinghoﬀ, How Will the Industry Respond to Increasing Government Pressure to Curb Drug Costs? Health-
Week, Dec. 10, 1990, at 28.
194Michael Conlan, Sullivan Warns States on Misuse of Medicaid’s Prior Authorization, Drug Topics, Mar. 11, 1991, at
114.
195As long as manufacturers kept the increase below inﬂation, they could avoid the “additional rebate,” while capturing
revenue from the higher prices. Firms’ process for determining the proper price increase that would serve to maximize revenues
has been studied extensively. See, e.g. Fries, T.L., Most-Favored-Nation Pricing Policy and Negotiated Prices, 9 Int’l J.
of Indus. Org., 209-223 (1991); I.P.L. Png, Most-Favored-Customer Protection versus Price Discrimination Over Time,
99 J. of Pol. Econ., 1010-1028 (1991). In one of the only non-government sponsored economic analysis of the impact on
prices of the Medicaid drug rebate law, Fiona Scott Morton found that about half of the drug manufacturers increased their
best price to a level where the ﬂat percentage AMP discount was larger than discounting to best price (and thus was the
rebate calculation applied). A ﬁrm would make the decision by calculating the proﬁts under both alternatives and making a
price decision to maximize proﬁt. See Fiona Scott Morton, The Strategic Response by Pharmaceutical Firms to the Medicaid
Most-Favored-Customer Rules, 28 RAND J. of Econ., 269, 275 (1997).
196In an unfortunate coincidence of timing, the VA ﬁver-year drug contracts were up for renewal in 1991, providing an
immediate opportunity for drug manufacturers to eliminate VA discounts. Karen Southwick and Merit C. Kimball, Other
Buyers May Pay Price for Medicaid Drug Discount, Health Week, Feb. 25, 1991, at 1. One report indicated that the VA
saw its drug costs increase by $60 million across the ﬁrst 11 months of 1991. Craig Havighurst, Drug price law goes to the ﬁx-it
shop—Congress tinkers with Medicaid discount as Pryor preps new bill, Health Week, Nov. 4, 1991, at 12.
52Pryor charged the manufacturers with several “bad faith” tactics including breaking long-term contracts in
order to increase drug prices, masking discounts and rebates, and giving purchasers other needed services
and products in lieu of discounts.198 He urged Wilensky to account for these hidden discounts in negotiating
rebates.
By March 1 all rebate agreements for the ﬁrst quarter of the program were completed. The results remained
disappointing. Senator Pryor took to the ﬂoor to register his protest, “The ink was not dry on the Medi-
caid legislation before drug companies decided the best response to this legislation was to begin a massive
cost shift to other vulnerable populations, rather than slightly trim excessive proﬁts or cut back on huge
marketing budgets.”199 Still, many found Pryor’s disdain naive. As one news article observed, “They [drug
manufacturers] seem to be telling the government, ‘What did you expect? Welcome to the world of big
business.”’200
Frustrations on the Hill led many to call for immediate hearings to examine the unintended consequence of
cost-shifting. But these hearings would be delayed. On April 16, Senator Pryor suﬀered a heart attack. The
author of the rebate bill was sidelined until June at the earliest. 201 Unfortunately, Pryor’s recuperation
ultimately would take longer than expected. The Senator did not return full time to work until September
1991.
As Pryor’s hiatus from the Senate dragged on, hard data was compiled to support the stories of inﬂation in
drug prices facing other drug purchasers. The General Accounting Oﬃce (GAO) released a report on the
impact of the Medicaid rebate program on VA and Department of Defense drug prices.202 GAO found that
198For example, Kaiser Permanent reported that it was being asked to renegotiate multiyear contracts that hadn’t expired.
Karen Southwick and Merit C. Kimball, supra note 196. See also, Conlan, supra note 197.
199137 Cong. Rec. S2711-01.
200Valentine Cardinale, Medicaid Law: Broken Promise?, Drug Topics, Mar. 11, 1991, at 8.
201Michael F. Conlan, Some Pharmacy Issues May Be Delayed by Senate Tragedies, Drug Topics, May 6, 1991, at 104.
202United States General Accounting Office, Report on Medicaid: Changes in Drug Prices Paid by VA and DOD
Since Enactment of Rebate Provisions, GAO/HRD-91-139 (Sept. 1991).
53VA costs in 1991 would increase 20 percent over 1990 expenditures while DOD would have a 14 percent
increase.203 Although GAO oﬃcially stated that it could not deﬁnitively attribute the price increases to
OBRA, most took the study results to conﬁrm that cost-shifting was occurring. Government purchasers
demanded a Congressional response, with VA representatives stating that without either additional funding
or changes to the Medicaid law “we will have to cut back on the delivery of health care.”204
In Pryor’s absence, the response to the outcry was ﬁelded by several players who ﬂoated corrections for the
perceived cost shifting problem:205
♣
Representative G.V. “Sonny” Montgomery (D-Miss.) introduced legislation to
exempt VA prices from best-price calculations and to roll back VA prices to their 1990 levels.206
♣ Representative Ron Wyden discussed two possibilities. First, he proposed making the rebate equal to
a percentage of manufacturers’ average retail price, thereby hoping to discourage increases in that price.
Second, he proposed to roll back Medicaid and all governmental drug prices to their 1990 level, and index
future price increases to overall health care inﬂation.207
♣ Senator Edward Kennedy introduced legislation requiring Public Health Service Act clinics receive re-
bates at least as large as those procured by the Medicaid program.208
♣ A stop-gap amendment was added to the Veterans Administrations appropriation bill, excluding Veter-
ans Administration prices from the best price calculation for Medicaid rebates. The measure was to sunset
on June 30, 1992 or upon passage of superceding drug price legislation related to the Department of Veterans
Aﬀairs.209
203Id. at 2.
204Veterans’ Aﬀairs Hearing, supra note 182.
205Several other bills would subsequently be introduced that proposed to amend the Medicaid drug rebate law. The list below
reﬂects only those in play by the end of September 1991.
207Havighurst, supra note 196.
208S. 1729 was introduced on September 19, 1991. Hearings on the bill were held in October 1991. Hearings on the Public
Health Clinic Prudent Pharmaceutical Purchasing Act before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Hum. Resources, 102nd Cong.
1 (1991).
209Departments of Veterans Aﬀairs, and Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act of
1992, Pub. L. No. 102-139, §519, 105 Stat. 736 (1991).
54Upon his return to the Senate, Pryor lent support to the developing eﬀorts of the other Congressmen but
was not eager to focus on the nitty-gritty of rebate amendments.210 Instead, he had moved on to “Phase
Two” of his attack on pharmaceutical pricing. “Phase Two” would be a more comprehensive approach
to containing prescription drug costs. The industry’s reaction to the Medicaid rebate bill evidenced that
“squeezing one part of the balloon” would only cause it to “pop out somewhere else.”211 Consequently,
pricing practices needed to be addressed head on and drug companies punished for raising prices at a rate
in excess of inﬂation.
Pryor’s Phase Two strategy was put into legislative language in “The Prescription Drug Cost Containment
Act (S. 2000),” introduced on November 21, 1991.212 The centerpiece of the plan called for a reduction of
pharmaceutical manufacturers’ non-research tax credits if they raised drug prices above the rate of inﬂa-
tion.213 The speciﬁc credits in question were found in Section 936 of the Internal Revenue Code and granted
manufacturers a tax credit per person employed in Puerto Rico.214 Pryor’s Aging Committee research in-
dicated that drug companies received more than $1.4 billion from these tax credits in 1987 alone, thereby
lowering companies’ eﬀective tax rate by an average of 9 percent.215 While a boon to the drug industry, the
Committee concluded that the credits provided “little if any beneﬁt to the American public.”216 By reducing
the tax credits if drug prices increased too steeply, Pryor’s S. 2000 would link the “ﬁnancial rewards” to
“acceptable and achievable performance standards.”217
210Although Pryor proposed amending the Medicaid rebate legislation to tie the best price provision to a speciﬁc date (as it
was in his original bill), this suggestion was never reduced to legislative language. Hearings on the Public Health Clinic Prudent
Pharmaceutical Purchasing Act, supra note 208, at 10.
211Id.
212S. 2000, 102nd Cong. (1991).
213Id. at §3. S. 2000 also would have established: a Medicare outpatient prescription drug demonstration project; a “Medicare
Outpatient Prescription Drug Trust Fund” ﬁnanced by the extra tax money received from the pharmaceutical companies; and
a Prescription Drug Policy Review Commission to report on national and international drug policy issues, among other minor
provisions. Id.
214§936 I.R.C.
215Staff of Senate Spec. Comm. on Aging, The Drug Manufacturing Industry: A Prescription for Profits 11-12,
17 (Comm. Print No. 102-50 (1991)).
216Id.
217Id. Pryor’s S. 2000 did not make much headway, but it did cause quite a stir with PMA and its members who deemed it
the “most critical” federal legislative issue of 1992. Pharm. Mfrs. Ass’n, 1992 Annual Report 6-7 (1993). Senator Pryor
55Pryor’s more ambitious and perhaps longer-term cost-containment goal did not eliminate the more imme-
diate need to make some ﬁxes to the OBRA rebate program. Still, the Senator’s greater distance from the
rebate amendments removed the heightened emotional element from these discussions with PMA. In fact,
Pryor’s unforeseen success seemed to make PMA more wary of the man than of the bill he had enacted. “It
must be clear to everyone by now that Senator Pryor has a vendetta against the pharmaceutical industry,”
PMA representatives stated.218 Fearing further Pryor activity, PMA’s ﬁght largely followed Pryor and his
price limiting tax-based legislation, not the rebate amendments.
This is not to say that PMA did not attend to the amendments proposed to the rebate bill. Nevertheless,
once the rebate law was in place, the inconsistent impact of the best price provisions on the diﬀerent manu-
facturing companies made it more diﬃcult for PMA to present a united front. For example, some companies
supported bills that would replace the best price provision with a ﬂat percentage rebate for Medicaid. By
contrast, other companies were dead set against the ﬂat percentage proposals and felt the program con-
tained in OBRA 1990 was working just ﬁne.219 The one proposal that was universally unpalatable to PMA
members was an attempt to counter VA price increases by rolling back drug prices to their 1990 level.220
However, the rollback provision failed to gain much traction, as many in Congress agreed with PMA that a
rollback would be “inherently unfair and unprecedented.”221
Thus, while hospital, HMO, nursing home, and government purchasers clamored for changes to OBRA 1990,
PMA rode along somewhat quietly. OBRA revisions were slow to come. Legislators were wary of acting too
attempted to oﬀer the 936 tax credit provision as an amendment to the tax legislation for 1992. After eight hours of ﬂoor
debate on the Pryor amendment, the proposal was defeated by a vote of 61 to 36 on March 11, 1992. Id. See also, 138 Cong.
Rec. S3179-03 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1992)(statement of Sen. David Pryor). Nevertheless, the Section 936 tax credit for drug
manufacturers was scaled back in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993. The reduction in the credit was not linked
to drug manufacturers pricing policy, however. Instead, the change scaled back the credit by $3.8 billion over ﬁve years. OBRA
1993, supra note 28.
218Julie Rovner, Prescription Drug Prices, CQ Researcher Online, July 17, 1992, available at
http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher.
219Veterans’ Aﬀairs Hearing, supra note 182.
220Id.
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56quickly, lest they “produce unintended consequences like best price did.”222 Moreover, the dominant leg-
islative responses to the cost-shifting problem—amendments either to exclude government purchasers from
best price calculations or to eliminate best price in favor of a ﬂat rebate percentage—had signiﬁcant political
problems. State Medicaid directors had seen substantial cost reductions due to the rebate provision, and
exclusion of government purchasers from best price calculations would reduce the state share of Medicaid
rebates by approximately $13.5 million in 1993 alone.223 A full repeal of the best price provision in favor of
a ﬂat rebate percentage would be even more costly to the states unless the rebate percentage was increased
substantially.224 Thus, as Pryor observed early on, the process of revising the rebate program served only to
“pit one group who pays slightly less ridiculous prices for prescription drugs against those groups that pay
more ridiculous prices for the same drugs.”225 That is, the discussion was no longer a ﬁght about reducing
prices charged by drug companies, but rather about creating winners and losers among purchasers.
After two years, three hearings, and many more bills addressing the perceived OBRA-stimulated cost-shifting,
the Medicaid drug rebate law was amended for the ﬁrst time. President George H. W. Bush signed “The
Veterans Health Care Act of 1992” on November 4, 1992.226 Title VI took up drug pricing agreements
and, in brief, required drug manufacturers enter drug pricing agreements with entities covered by the Public
Health Service Act and with the Veterans’ Aﬀairs to continue receiving Medicaid outpatient drug reimburse-
ment; increased slightly the minimum rebate percentages beginning October 1, 1992;227 and excluded prices
charged to government entities from the best price calculation. The Veterans Act amendments ignored the
222Drug Rebate Debate Heats Up, Health Legislation & Regulation, Sept 9, 1992.
223The Prescription Drug Rebate Program: Hearing on H.R. 2890, H.R. 3450, and H.R. 5614 before the Subcomm. On Health
and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102nd Cong. 31 (1992)(letter from the Congressional
Budget Oﬃce to the Honorable John D. Dingell).
224To retain budget neutrality, a ﬂat rebate would have to rise to 22 percent in 1993, 19 percent in 1994, 17 percent in 1995
and 16 percent thereafter. Id. Congressional desire to engage PMA in a ﬁght over this large increase was low.
225Hearings on the Public Health Clinic Prudent Pharmaceutical Purchasing Act before the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Hum. Resources, supra note 208, at 10 (statement of Senator David Pryor). The federal government would also lose signiﬁcant
rebates estimated at $18 million in FY 1993, $13 million in FY 1994 and $8 million in FY 1995.
226Veterans Health Care Act of 1992, supra note 19.
227The minimum rebate of 15 percent beginning January 1, 1993 was replaced with a sliding scale for years 1993 through 1995.
Rebates required were: 15.7% from September 30, 1992 through December 31, 1993; 15.4 percent January 1, 1994 through
December 31, 1994; 15.2 percent January 1, 1995 through December 31, 1995; and 15.1% beginning January 1, 1996. Id.
57cost-shifting concerns of large non-government purchasers, and left HMOs and hospitals continuing the call
for a repeal of the best price provision. However, a GAO report released in January 1993, which concluded
that “we could not determine the extent to which the price increases were attributable to (the 1990 law),”
diﬀused the power of these purchasers’ complaints.228
The only other substantive amendments to the Medicaid drug rebate law came on the heels of the ﬁrst
change, incorporated into the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA 1993).229 OBRA 1993
gave states permission to use drug formularies under the rebate law. It also eliminated an exemption that
forbade states from imposing prior authorization on new drugs within six months of FDA approval. Other
smaller changes in the rebate calculation method were also included. PMA predictably fought the formulary
provision more vigorously than it did the amendments of the Veterans Aﬀairs bill. Nevertheless, because
prior authorization systems were already largely being used as de facto formularies in many states, the change
was less harmful to PMA members than it appeared on its face.
Epilogue
In 1995, Senate Finance Committee Republicans included in their Medicaid reform proposal a provision to
sunset the Medicaid drug rebate program by 1998.230 PMA (by then renamed PhRMA) cheered the plan,
lambasting the rebate program and the “billions” of dollars it had cost drug manufacturers since 1990.231
Political observers speculated that President Clinton would have vetoed any Medicaid reform package con-
taining such language, but the proposal did not get that far.232 Instead, the drug manufacturers’ old foe
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58that cut them down at the pass. In the Finance Committee markup of the reform plan, Senator David
Pryor introduced an amendment preserving the rebates. Pryor shrewdly passed his amendment by using a
voice vote so to allow “GOP Senators to support the rebate program without risking retaliation from the
politically powerful pharmaceutical industry.”233 Since this defeat, a sunset of the rebate provision has never
again come close to materializing.
And thus the Medicaid rebate law remains on the books today. Interestingly, both its proponent and oppo-
nent remain unsatisﬁed with its work. Fearing widespread use of the rebate program to gain discounts for
non-Medicaid populations, PhRMA would still be enamored if the provision were to disappear. For his part,
David Pryor still worries about drug prices and the pricing practices of the pharmaceutical industry. Today,
retired and back in Arkansas, Senator David Pryor continues to believe the drug companies are giving Amer-
ican consumers a raw deal. To most observers, the Medicaid drug rebate program was one of the biggest
legislative defeats suﬀered by the pharmaceutical industry. By contrast, Pryor remains less enthusiastic, “I
never saw this [Medicaid rebates] as a major victory. I never saw this as a big bill.”234 He continues to hope,
albeit skeptically, that a big victory may be just around the corner.
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